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Terry's Original Sin
Jeffrey Fagan

I. INTRODUCTION
In Mapp v. Ohio,' the U.S. Supreme Court extended the due
process protections of the exclusionary rule to include all
"constitutionally unreasonable searches" that were done without a
basis of probable cause. 2 In the seven years after Mapp, when homicide
rates in the U.S. nearly doubled, 3 riots broke out in at least forty-seven
U.S. cities.4 During the same era, a heroin epidemic gripped the
nation's urban centers,5 giving rise to street drug markets and
associated violence and pressures on law enforcement to curb those
markets.6 As violence increased, a turn in the nation's political culture
questioned Mapp's restraints on police discretion to stop and search
criminal suspects.7 Indeed, some writers wondered if the Mapp
standard, with its reliance on the exclusionary rule to deter violations

t Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, and Professor of Epidemiology,
Columbia University. Thanks to Amanda Geller and John MacDonald for their contributions to
the analysis. Rachel Harmon, Wayne Logan, Sonja Starr, David Sklansky, Erik Luna and
workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School provided important comments on
earlier drafts. Thanks to Logan Gowdey and Sophia Harris for excellent research assistance.

Jeffrey Fagan served as expert witness for plaintiffs in Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 959 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2013); and Davis v. City of
New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). All opinions and errors also are solely mine.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 Id. at 655.

Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, Estimated Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter
1961-68, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/SearchlCrime/State/RunCrimeTrendsInOneVar.cfm

[https://

perma.cc/B49Y-C3B8].
4

KERNER COMM'N, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 19-60 (1968).

o

See, e.g., Michael Agar and Heather Schacht Reisinger, A Heroin Epidemic at the

Intersection of Histories: The 1960s Epidemic Among African Americans in Baltimore, 21 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY 115 (2002).
6 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF

CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1965) (discussing the links between the rise of heroin addiction and
criminal violence in the mid-1960s); see generally 2 LEON HUNT & CARL CHAMBERS, THE HEROIN
EPIDEMICS: A STUDY OF HEROIN USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1965-75 (1976).
See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 739 (1970).
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of Fourth Amendment rights, had inflicted social costs on the public
through over-deterrence of police, leading to elevated crime rates.8
It was no surprise, then, that after those seven years the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio 9 "uncoupled . .. the two clauses of the Fourth
Amendment" that regulated temporary detentions and searches by
police. 10 Terry dealt with a different "rubric of police conduct": the beat
officer stopping and patting down an individual on the street, more
commonly known as an "investigative stop."" The Terry test was (and
is) thus to balance the scope of the intrusion against the "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion." 12 Justice Douglas, in
dissent, labeled this "reasonable suspicion." 13 Although intended to be a
narrow departure from Mapp's standard, it was in fact a big break from
Mapp. 14 The Court said that the Mapp rule simply did not fit the
realities of street policing in an era of rising crime rates.
Under Terry, the police must articulate specific and individualized
indicia of suspicion, and those indicia must be salient enough to justify
police action. Hunches by police worried the Terry Court.15 The
standards then and now do not really tell a police officer doing modern
police work how much suspicion is enough to satisfy constitutional
standards, or when the quantity of suspicion reaches a threshold of
"reasonableness" to justify the intrusion. That question became even
more challenging as a series of opinions inflated the scope of
"reasonable suspicion" to include pretextual probable cause stopsoften minor traffic violations-that open the door to investigations of
other crimes, 16 or stops where a suspect's presence in a "high crime
See generally Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary
Rule: An Empirical Assessment, in 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (Summer 1983); see also Potter
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
ExclusionaryRule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1439-40 (1983); William
J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445
(1996).
9 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10
See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A
Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891, 900 (1998).
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 35.
12
Id. at 21.
8

Id. at 38.

See id. at 27 ("[There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search
for weapons for the protection of the police officer . .
.

14

1

Id. at 22.

See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also David A. Sklansky,
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
1
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area" multiplies less salient factors into actionable suspicion," or
facially subjective rationales such as "furtive movements" or other
criminal appearances."
As the fiftieth anniversary of the Terry opinion approaches, it is
more than reasonable to ask whether Terry's move away from probable
cause was original sin-whether the dilution and expansion of
standards for an investigative stop over time compromised or advanced
the very law enforcement interests that animated the Terry opinion.
Two criteria of (constitutional) focus are wrapped up in the "law
enforcement interest" doctrine: catching offenders and seizing
contraband (hit rates), and controlling crime (crime rates). Whether
contemporary and expanded Terry standards can achieve or undermine
these interests is the primary question for this paper.
Do these sins pay? This is the central question for this article. Sins
where officers stop, temporarily detain, question, and possibly frisk a
person based on the person's vague or subjectively perceived actions
(appearances, movements) may be less efficient in locating contraband
or suppressing crime than stops based on actuarial characteristics
(locations). But both may be less efficient than stops based on
behavioral indicia of crime. In other words, this article asks empirically
whether stops based on indicia that approximate probable cause (based
on behavioral indicia that are unambiguously indicative of crime)
advance law enforcement interests significantly more than stops based
on the more subjective and vague standards that have become,commonplace features of contemporary investigative stop programs.
Perhaps these sins pay for only certain types of crime. Terry's
ruling came in the midst of a violent crime spike in the late 1960s
through the early 1970s.18 But Terry is now applied broadly for violent
and other serious crimes as well as for drug and weapon offenses. And
in an era of proactive and "broken windows" policing, minor
misdemeanors are theorized as predicates of crime and therefore are
indicia of suspicion in and of themselves.1 9 This leads to the second
question for this paper: whether the dilution of standards has
differential effects by crime seriousness.

271, 274-91 (1997).
" See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); see also Andrew Ferguson & Damien
Bernache, The "High-CrimeArea" Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for
Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1606 (2008).
'8 See Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, supra note 3.
" See generally Phillip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000); see
also JACK MAPLE WITH CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD
BUSINESS (2000).

GuYs
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The answers to these questions follow. The first section assesses
the doctrinal progression from Mapp to Terry, showing that the original
officer safety rationale was eclipsed over time by Terry's crime control
agenda. The second section presents the details of the empirical inquiry
on the two research questions. Data on crimes, stops, and arrests from
2004 to 2012 from the Floyd v. City of New York 20 litigation are
analyzed to address these questions. The data include the bases of
suspicion for each stop, and stops are assigned as probable cause or
suspicion stops based on the articulated rationale. The third section
presents the empirical results. The analyses show significant
reductions in crime in neighborhoods (census block groups) with
greater numbers of probable cause stops, and ratios of probable cause
stops to other stops. The opposite, however, is not evident. Crime
neither increases nor decreases in places with higher numbers of nonprobable cause stops; those stops simply have no effect on local crime
rates. This is an empirical argument about what kinds of police
observations of suspicion are indicative of criminal activity, and how
acting on those indicia can advance Terry's public safety agenda.
The final section discusses a set of potential regulatory and
doctrinal responses to these results that suggest the application of
harm principles to inform the practice of Terry stops that raise privacy
and positive liberty interests. This section presents a functional,
institutional argument about what kinds of observations of supposedly
suspicious activity are susceptible to meaningful review and oversight.
It turns out that redemption for Terry's sins may be close at hand:
fleshing out the Terry standard by setting clear rules about what
constitutes "reasonable suspicion," and concretely linking the Terry
standard to specific actions indicative of criminal activity will reduce
errors in suspicion and better prevent crime.
II. BACKGROUND

From Mapp to Terry

A.

Bad timing is one factor that led to the shift in standards for
investigative stops and searches from Mapp to Terry. Rising violent
crime rates through much of the 1960s, 2 1 together with riots in dozens
of American cities, 22 helped create new social tensions and a legal and
20
21

959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra

note 6.
22

KERNER COMM'N, supra note 4; see also Fred R. Harris & Roger W. Wilkins, Quiet Riots:

Race and Poverty in the United States, in THE KERNER REPORT: TWENTY YEARS LATER (1988).
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policy context in which law enforcement interests eclipsed the restraint
on Fourth Amendment violations that was Mapp's inspiration. As crime
rates continued to rise through the next two decades, the focus of
Terry's jurisprudence-and the law enforcement interests that it
embodied-shifted from officer safety to public safety. The standards
regulating reasonable suspicion, the foundation of Terry, also shifted
over time as the public safety interests of Terry hardened and
expanded. In this section, the trajectory of this subtle jurisprudential
shift is examined, laying the foundation of contemporary Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence on the limits of police stop-and-search
power.
1. What Mapp did and did not do.
In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule applies to state prosecutions. 23 The Court had previously held that
the exclusionary rule applies to unconstitutionally seized evidence in
federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States.24 But when the Court
applied the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause to the states in Wolf
v. Colorado,25 the Court held that the exclusionary rule was not a
necessary component of the Fourth Amendment's protection. 26
Mapp thus stands for the proposition that the probable cause
requirement is toothless if not backed by a consequence that "remov[es]
the incentive to disregard it."27 The Weeks Court more fully discussed
the details of the probable cause requirement. 28 In Weeks, the Court
held for the first time that the Constitution requires exclusion from
federal criminal prosecutions evidence obtained without a warrant,
issued by a judge, supported by probable cause, and describing the
object of the search. Implicit in the Weeks decision is the proposition
that the "reasonableness" of a given search under the first clause of the
Fourth Amendment is defined by the warrant requirement in the
second clause of the amendment. 29 More specifically, Weeks said the
Fourth Amendment protects individuals against "all unreasonable

23
24

26

27
28
2

367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
See id. at 33.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393-94.
See U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
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searches and seizures," which it then defined as those searches done
without a "warrant issued as required by the Constitution." 30
Similarly, Mapp described itself as "extending the substantive
protections of due process," that is, the exclusionary rule, "to all
constitutionally unreasonablesearches"-those done without a warrant
issued on a showing of probable cause. 31 The meaning of an
unreasonable search was a search conducted without a warrant; the
two clauses of the Fourth Amendment were linked. 32
2. The limits of exclusion.
Earl Dudley notes that the meanings of neither reasonable
suspicion to justify a frisk nor Terry stops to justify minor "physical
intrusions" are readily apparent from the text of the Terry opinion. 33 In
Adams v. Williams,34 the first post-Terry decision on stop and frisk,
Justice Rehnquist doubled-down on the Warren Court's reasonableness
standard by conflating "stops" with protective "frisks," and applying the
same vague reasonableness standard to both levels of intrusion.35
The phrase "reasonable suspicion" comes from Justice Douglas's
dissenting opinion, when he criticized the Court's departure from the
"certainty" and historical grounding of the probable cause
requirement. 36 Scott Sundby similarly notes, "Chief Justice Warren's
cautious opinion suggests that the use of the reasonableness balancing
test was meant to be viewed as a narrow departure from the norm of
probable cause." 37 And Stephen Saltzburg argues that, taking the
opinion at face value, "the Court would appear to have decided little."38
Therefore, for courts in the aftermath of Terry, it was not at all clear

Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392-93.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
32
Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1998).
" Dudley, supra note 10, at 896.
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
" See id. at 146 ("A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time."); see also Carol Steiker,
Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L. J. 329, 338 (2013).
36 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A PracticallyPerfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 911, 929 (1998). It is
almost bitterly ironic that Justice Douglas's phrase has come to be so closely associated with the
Terry standard he disagreed with. It was not until Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, that the
Court referred to the Terry standard as "reasonable suspicion." 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973); see also
Saltzburg, supra, at 945.
3
Sundby, supra note 32, at 1135.
' Saltzburg, supra note 36, at 925-26.
30
31
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how to regulate investigative stops in a novel framework of reasonable
suspicion.
However, before the Court reached the merits of Terry's claim, it
discussed the exclusionary rule in a highly suggestive way that
highlights the break the Court was making from Mapp. 39 In effect, the
Court said that the exclusionary rule was powerless and irrelevant to
the realities of contemporary beat policing. 40 First, the Court noted
that, for many interactions, "the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest
of serving some other goal," rendering the exclusion of evidence
useless. 41 Second, the Court mentioned the risk of "wholesale
harassment" of minority groups by police, but again stated that this
''will not be stopped by the exclusion of . . . evidence from any criminal
trial." 42
Third and most important, the Court stated that applying the
exclusionary rule where it is incapable of stopping police abuse "may
exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime." 43 This mention of the crime control objective is muted here, but
grows in importance in subsequent rulings, and occupies center stage
in the Floyd litigation and in replications of the Terry regime in a
swath of U.S. cities and across several countries. 44 In effect, the Court
took a lesser of evils approach where abuses-both of minorities and
the boundaries of investigative stops-are tolerated in return for

3

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-15.
Id.; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating "[I doubt that] the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have
allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such
40

indignity"). Justice Scalia went on to say, however, that the framers were not concerned with the

likelihood that the criminals of that day were carrying concealed firearms. Id.; see also Erich J.
Segall, Will the Real Justice Scalia Please Stand Up?, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 106-07 (2015)
(quoting Justice Scalia's concurrence in Dickerson and explaining his qualification of his own
ambivalence on Terry's "petty indignities").
41

Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.

Id. at 14-15; see, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213,
1218 (1998) (discussing a nosology of harms that are inevitable in the proactive policing regimes
that emerged in the 1990s); Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
956, 962-73 (1999) (revisiting Terry to show its forgotten racial meaning and implications);
Jeffrey Fagan, Ackerman Lecture Series on Equality and Justice: Indignities of Order
Maintenance (Nov. 21, 2013) (showing the racial components of the dignity incursions inherent in
Terry stops).
43 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
42

44 See, e.g., AMY LERMAN & VESLA WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014); Ben Bradford et al., Police, Crime and
Order: The Case of Stop and Search, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POLICING

(Summer 2016); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of
Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 163 (2015).
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enhanced crime control, a matter that is challenged in the empirics
here.
The focus on the limits of the exclusionary rule at the beginning of
the Terry opinion reads as a justification for applying a standard other
than probable cause to the types of investigative stops upheld in Terry.
The Court says that the Mapp rule does not fit the realities of beat
policing because it is too slow to account for public safety concerns and
because the remedy-exclusion of evidence-fails to correct police
misconduct. In effect, the Court minimized the possibility of deterrent
effects on future police misconduct of the suppression of evidence. The
Terry standard of reasonable suspicion is thus a vindication of the
Court's public-safety concerns over the trial-focused exclusionary rule
of Mapp. Perhaps the Court had a regulatory purpose in mind instead
of a deterrence purpose. The Court was optimistic that police could
lean heavily on the internal processes and self-discipline of their
institutions to do the work that would have fallen within Mapp's
litigation domain. But the Court also discounted the prospect of an
inevitable parade of suppression hearings that would follow the shift
from the more demanding Mapp standard to the subjective, if not
inchoate, standard in Terry.
B.

The Terry Standard and the Regulation of Police: Defining-or
Failing to Define-Reasonable Suspicion

The new Terry standards did no favor to trial courts by defining in
such a subjective way the new standards for street stops that could be
challenged. But as the analysis of those standards in this section
shows, the Court may have (whether by design or not) mitigated that
risk by advancing a standard where subjectivity was subordinated to a
highly proceduralized standard.
1. Terry, investigative stops, and a new set of state intrusions.
By requiring reasonable suspicion for stop and frisks, Terry
extended the Fourth Amendment to seizures less intrusive than
arrests. In effect, the Supreme Court "uncoupled ... the two clauses of
the Fourth Amendment." 45 The Terry Court did not overrule Mapp: the
warrant requirement, backed by the exclusionary rule, still applies to
the traditional police-at-the-front-door search of an individual's
dwelling. 46 But it is hard not to see Terry as a victory for police because

4
46

Dudley, supra note 10, at 900.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ("We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever
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it recovers much of the discretion and, to be frank, the power that had
been revoked in Mapp,4 7 and later in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville.4 8
Terry dealt with a different "rubric of police conduct" than did
Mapp: the beat officer stopping and patting down an individual on the
street.4 9 In footnote sixteen, the Terry majority went further: it refused
to consider the question of whether an "investigative 'seizure' upon less
than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation"
violates the Fourth Amendment.5 0 Then the Court narrowly defined the
notion of "seizure" as instances "when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen."5 1
Still, even as the Court "emphatically reject[ed]" suggestions that
the stop-interrogate-and-frisk interaction is not subject to the Fourth
Amendment, 52 the Court just as clearly rejected the notion that
probable cause was required for the "limited search for weapons" at
issue in the case. 53 It is not hard to see the standard for such limited
searches metastasizing over time into the Floyd regime in New York,
with millions of street searches over a decade producing few guns or
contraband. 5 4 Instead, the Court adopted a rule from a case involving
administrative searches of homes, Camara v. Municipal Court,5 5
requiring courts to "balanc[e] the need to search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."5 6
The Terry test, in turn, balanced the scope of the intrusion (e.g.,
whether the police officer "patted down the outer clothing" or
"conduct[ed] a general exploratory search") against the "specific and
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure . . . .").
47 David A. Harris, ParticularizedSuspicion, CategoricalJudgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric

Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 985 (1998) ("[T]he
conclusion is inescapable that in Terry the police won back a significant part of the power they
needed to conduct business according to pre-Mapp standards.").
48

405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.

'o Id. at 19 n.16; see also Dudley, supra note 10, at 896-98.
' Terry, 392 U.S at 19 n.16.
52
Id. at 16.
" Id. at 25-26.
5 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Report of
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ.
01034) (hereinafter Fagan Report); Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) (hereinafter Fagan
Supplemental Report).

5

387 U.S. 523 (1967).
% Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 537).
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articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."5 7 This move in effect
distinguishes Terry from Mapp and all cases involving actual arrests.
Because "[a]n arrest is the initial stage of criminal prosecution," it
serves very different social interests than a Terry search, which was
designed to protect "the police officer, where he has reason to believe he
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."58
Although the majority opinion does not address a frisk or patdown, a Terry frisk also required reasonable suspicion that the
individual being frisked presents a danger to the officer or others at the
time.5 9 This specificity requirement is in contrast with the "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' which is insufficient to
justify the intrusion on an individual's liberty.6 0 On the other hand, the
Court's disapproval of "hunches" was tempered by its tolerance of "the
specific reasonable inferences which [the police officer] is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience." 61 Ultimately, the
standard is characterized by the Terry Court as "objective," and must
hold up to the "more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge" who is to
ask whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that the action taken was appropriate." This approach requires
balancing the level of suspicion of danger against the invasion of
privacy and autonomy, something that an officer in the moment of an
encounter with a citizen may be hard pressed to do. 6 2
After nearly four decades, the Terry standard remains rather
opaque. 63 In describing the government's burden, William Stuntz
analogizes to a statistical determination:
The threshold is not defined mathematically, but one could
easily enough think of it that way, and courts and lawyers
basically do think of it that way.. .. (Though, I should quickly
add, there is no clear agreement on what the right mathematical

Id. at 21, 29-30.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 21.
6
Id. at 27.
61 Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 42, at 971 (noting that the Court celebrated Officer
McFadden's lengthy tenure and experience in policing the same neighborhood where he stopped
John Terry and his colleagues).
62
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
* Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 850 (2011); see, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 42, at 1215 ("[R]easonable suspicion
has never received a solid definition. (Perhaps it can't).").
*
*
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line is. Probable cause officially means "a fair probability;" in
practice, it means, roughly, more-likely-than-not. Reasonable
suspicion plainly requires less than probable cause. A good
approximation, then, might be something like a one-in-five or
one-in-four chance.)"
Thus, the burden of proof is quite low. Given an estimate of a
twenty or twenty-five percent chance a crime is about to occur or has
occurred, proving a "hunch"-the type of suspicion, with a capacious
tolerance for error, Terry condemns-requires a very low probability
indeed.
2. Regulating reasonableness.
In the same part of the opinion that explains the shortcomings of
the exclusionary rule as a check on street policing, Terry appears to
suggest that the rule remains the primary judicial check. For instance,
the Court says that, when applying Terry, if courts identify "overbearing or harassing" conduct, "it must be condemned by the judiciary
and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials." 65 Still,
the Court here is directing lower courts to focus on conduct during the
stop, not the indicia of suspicion that motivated the stop.
The Court in fact excluded evidence on these grounds in Sibron v.
New York, 66 a companion case to Terry. Both Terry and Sibron came to
the Supreme Court as appeals from trial court denials of motions to
suppress.67 While introduction of the weapon uncovered from the frisk
in Terry was admissible, the Sibron evidence was excluded on grounds
that the search was not justified by the protective interest that
motivated the officer in Terry. Sibron involved a police officer who
searched Sibron after observing him "talking to a number of known
addicts." 68 The Court noted that the Terry rule only justified limited
frisks where particular facts support an inference of danger to the
officer, which was not present based on an individual speaking with

"
M
6
67

William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive Law, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1362, 1362 (2012).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 47-48. In Terry, the Court somewhat

cryptically noted that its "approval of legitimate and restrained investigative conduct undertaken
on the basis of ample factual justification should in no way discourage the employment of other

remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove
inappropriate." 392 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). However, the Court did not itself suggest any
alternate remedies.
6
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62.

54

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

known addicts.6 9 The Court went further, distinguishing the Sibron
search from the Terry search, which initially "consisted solely of a
limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed
objects," with the officer "plac[ing] his hands in [Terry's] pockets" only
after "discover[ing] [a concealed] object."7 0

The Terry-Sibron comparison illuminates the Court's concerns
about individual dignity. In Terry, the Court justified its application of
the Fourth Amendment to frisks (but not stops) because it found a frisk
to be "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."71 The Court
addressed this intrusion by requiring a balancing between the level of
intrusion and the level of suspicion. It could be the case that the harm
to a person's dignity from the intrusion of a frisk may be greater than
the harm to dignity resulting from a full search incident to arrest. The
reason may lie in the difference in the standard for a frisk versus a
search: a full search incident to arrest requires probable cause, which
suggests specific behavioral and inherently concrete indicia of
suspicion. A frisk, in contrast, need only be justified by the more
subjective and inchoate standards of reasonable suspicion.
3. How much reasonable suspicion? What indicia?
Both in the run-up to Terry and the decades after, courts never
developed a constitutional consensus as to how much suspicion is
needed to give rise to reasonable suspicion. 72 Nor are there substantive
indicia to prioritize or weigh which behaviors or factors matter; the
courts have said only that these indicia must be reasonable. Some
courts have argued for a test based on the efficacy of stops in detecting
crime or locating contraband, but here too, there is no agreement on
what constitutes an acceptable "hit rate" that satisfies the
reasonableness standard across cases. In Navarette v. California,73 for
example, Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that at least five, if not ten
percent, of the entire universe of incidents would need to be an accurate
"hit" to be indicative of reasonable suspicion. According to Scalia,
69

Id.

"
71

Id. at 65.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 17; see also id. at 24-25 ("Even a limited search of the outer clothing for
weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.").
72 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("Unfortunately, there can be
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails."); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the
Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 58 (2015);
Harcourt & Meares, supranote 63.
7 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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absent such a showing, the basis of suspicion is not reasonable without
further information. 74 A similar outcomes test was considered in Floyd
to claim that the police were so often wrong in the bases of suspicion for
their stops that those bases were categorically faulty.7 5
But after nearly five decades of Terry, courts have rejected a
substantive review of the criteria of "reasonable suspicion." Instead,
courts have consistently decided cases based on some rendering of the
reasoning of the officers at the scene (based on a post-hoc account)
pursuant to a specific fact, and whether that reasoning was, well,
reasonable to an experienced officer. 76 But it gets worse. Until recently,
a series of cases required that the basis of the information on which
reasonable suspicion was determined be reliable.7 7 But in Navarette,
the Court largely abandoned the reliability doctrine by holding that an
anonymous 911 call without any corroboration meets a test of
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and seizure.78
Under the real-time demands of police work, and with little
oversight to correct misapplication of the perceptual and reasoning
processes, the articulation of suspicion often defaults to behavioral
scripts that are matched to fill in the empty cognitive spaces in the
actual bases of suspicion. 79 In three out of four street stops in New York
City, for example, police observe a suspect for less than two minutes
before proceeding to what New York state law8 o defines as an
"intrusion."8 1 The stop requires officers to perform a quick perceptual
and cognitive sorting of complicated and highly contextualized
information that shapes the initial evaluation of suspicion. As the
interaction unfolds, this sorting is modified and narrowed through
interactions and exchanges between the suspect and the officer(s). After
Id. at 1695.
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (pointing to
the fact that "[tihe rate of arrests arising from stops is low . . and the yield of seizures of guns or
other contraband is even lower," and noting "that the City's attempt to account for the low rate of
74
7

arrests and summonses following stops was not persuasive").
'6

Fagan & Geller, supra note 72.
See Steven Grossman, Whither Reasonable Suspicion: The Supreme Court's Functional
Abandonment of the Reasonableness Requirement for Fourth Amendment Seizures, 53 AM. CRIM. L.
7

REV. 349, 350 (2016) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964)).
78
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686.
7
Fagan & Geller, supra note 72.
a See People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-72 (N.Y. 1976). In contrast to the two-stage
inquiry developed in Terry, De Bour articulates four levels of suspicion correlated with four levels
of justified intrusion. See also People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. 1992). Most states
follow

Terry.

For

example,

Massachusetts

follows

constitutional

Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (2001).
8 Fagan Report, supra note 54.

Terry

standards.

See
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all this, the officer then retreats to an unspecified location under
uncertain conditions to record the reasons for the encounter, reasons
that may have taken place and been cognitively encoded an hour or
more before.
It is no wonder that police officers may default to a script. But even
with the handy crutch of a script, the cognitive burden to both
articulate the reasons for the suspicion, and how those reasons got
beyond a (not well articulated) threshold to take action, leaves a wide
space for error in perceptions, weighing, and decision-making.
The configuration of Terry and its progeny simply begs the
question as to what factors meet the test of articulable and
individualized. These cases continue, as did Terry itself, the fiction that
there is a threshold of suspicion that renders police action
constitutionally permissible. Suspicion in this formulation thus
becomes a hurdle model, or a binary category, in which the stop is
either constitutional or not. 82 Courts worry more than the police about
whether there is enough suspicion to get over that hurdle and satisfy
the "individualized" suspicion test. And the elasticity of the Terry
standards complicates the job of courts to regulate those decisions. 83
Officers are left to the extremes of roll call training on the one hand
and litigation challenges on the other to define a space in which their
actions comport with the shifting territory of the Fourth Amendment."
C.

Terry's Crime Control Agenda

Terry's original sin took two forms. First the majority created the
reasonable suspicion standard that allowed subjective assessments of
suspects' behavior to substitute for the more demanding standard of
probable cause. This was done, as discussed earlier, in the interest of
protecting officers from harm. The Terry Court declined to articulate
clear standards of suspicion, defaulting the professional "experience"
and judgment of the officer.85 The second sinful act was the doctrinal
shift over time from the original officer safety rationale to permitting
reasonable suspicion stops in the interest of crime control. This section
examines the evolution of this second sin, and describes the rationale
for modern Terry practice.
82

See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 63.

See Meares, supra note 44, at 172-76.
See Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law on the Street: How
Police Academies Teach Evolving FourthAmendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 319-31 (2000).
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) ("We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot. . . .").
8
'
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1. Terry's hidden crime control agenda.
A first reading of the majority opinion in Terry suggests that it had
little to do with crime control, and everything to do with the safety of
police officers in conducting investigative stops or field interrogations. 8 6
The Court seemed to be well aware that it was making a trade-off: in
allowing "something less than a 'full' search" at a new and relaxed
standard of "reasonable suspicion," the Court held that the Terry stop
"must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." 87
At first glance then, the Terry Court's concern seemed to be less
about public safety generally, but rather the safety of the officer when
approaching and questioning individuals like John Terry. The
President's 1965 Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Criminal Justice reported that "[c]ommission
observers of police streetwork in high-crime neighborhoods of some
large cities report that 10 percent of those frisked were found to be
carrying guns, and another 10 percent were carrying knives."8 8 But the
report did not mention officer injuries or deaths in routine contacts as
posing the danger that drove the Terry ruling.
In fact, the only evidence the Terry Court cites about the dangers of
policing is a reference to the same 1965 Presidential Commission and is
contained in a footnote, worrying that frisks often exacerbate tensions
between the police and minority groups.89 In the end, the Court does
not tie the crime-control or officer-safety aspects of the opinion to any
evidence. In the years between Mapp and Terry, officer deaths rose as
overall rates of violent crime rose, but the Terry Court made no note of
this.9 0

8 The Terry Court states specifically that, "[t]he sole justification of the search in the present
situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby." Id. at 29. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 26. But see Steiker, supra note 35 (arguing the officer safety standard was extended
four years after Terry in Adams v. Williams from the frisk to the stop, via a textual mashup of the
facts of the Adams stop with the text of the Terry opinion).
8
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY 94-95 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/42.pdf [https://perma.cc/

M6HY-RDPA].
8 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11.
9

In the years between Mapp and Terry, total officer deaths (not just those resulting from

felony crimes by suspects) increased from 140 in 1961 to 191 in 1968. In the decade after Terry, as
violent crime overall increased, officer deaths increased from 194 in 1969 to 215 in 1978, with a
peak of 280 in 1974. See Officer Deaths by Year, NAT'L LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL

FUND, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-datalyear.html [https://perma.cciKU2E-5JYE]
(including all officer deaths, not just officers killed by criminal suspects). Of the 1466 officers
killed from 2005-14, 482 (32.9%) were killed in auto or motorcycle crashes, and 554 (37.6%) were
killed by criminal suspects. The remainder died from a variety of natural or accidental causes.
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But in fact, crime control and public safety were as much on the
minds of the justices as was officer safety. Two concurring justices and
a third dissenting justice more directly alluded to a general crimeprevention rationale for the Terry holding than does the Court's
majority opinion. First, Justice Harlan, who rejected the Court's effort
to decouple the "frisk" issue from the "stop" issue, concurred to make
clear that, to him, the stop was constitutional "only because
circumstances warranted [the officer] forcing an encounter with Terry
in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime."9 1 Thus, for Justice
Harlan, the intrusion of the stop and frisk needed the crime-prevention
rationale to survive constitutional scrutiny. Although Justice Harlan
described his opinion as merely "fill[ing] in a few gaps" in the majority
opinion, the reference to preventing crime more broadly than the
potential harm to the police officer conducting the frisk nowhere
appears in the Court's opinion.92
Second, Justice White, in the second paragraph of his twoparagraph concurrence, provides "an additional word ...
concerning
93
the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop." Like Justice
Harlan, Justice White emphasizes the link between "temporary
detention" and the frisk that the majority opinion sought to avoid. But
he went further than Justice Harlan to speculate about a possible
crime-prevention benefit of frisks that fail to uncover any weapons:
"Perhaps the frisk itself, where proper, will have beneficial results
whether questions are asked or not. If weapons are found, an arrest
will follow. If none are found, the frisk may nevertheless serve
preventive ends because of its unmistakable message that suspicion has
been aroused." 94 The two concurrences bookend two different
theoretical supports for investigative stops: while Justice Harlan
appears to have identified the crime-prevention rationale based on
police intervention before a crime is committed, Justice White
apparently saw a general crime-prevention effect in the failure to

Causes of Law Enforcement Deaths, NAT'L LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICERs MEMORIAL FUND,

[https://perma.cclY6JM-NAL2].
http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/causes.html
One writer calculated that felonious deaths of police officers averaged 62.8 per year from 1960-65,
and rose to 76.6 in the four years surrounding the Terry opinion, again commensurate with an
overall increase in violent crime. See Dan Wang, Data on Police Officers Killed Since 1961,
[https://
WANG
(June 16,
2015),
http://danwang.co/statistics-on-police-fatalities/
DAN
perma.ccN7S9-7U9R] (citing evidence from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports dating to 1961).
9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
9
Id. at 31. Justice Rehnquist continued this conflation of stop-and-frisk rationales in Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See also Steiker, supra note 35.
9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added).
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uncover weapons as a way to educate citizens about what police officers
find suspicious.
Justice Douglas dissented alone in Terry. He was implacable about
the necessity of the probable cause requirement for a temporary
detention and a frisk or pat down of a suspect. 95 In passing, however,
he acknowledged-noting the escalating crime rates in the years after
Mapp-that"[p]erhaps [the Terry rule] is desirable to cope with modern
forms of lawlessness." 96 This seems an oblique reference to a general
crime-prevention rationale that goes beyond the narrower interest in
officer safety enunciated by the majority. 97
In the few states that developed doctrine that differed from Terry,
the controlling opinions also incorporated both crime control and officer
safety prongs. 98 In People v. De Bour,99 officer safety was a less pressing
concern than was the broader public safety impetus for the pursuit and
frisk of the suspect. The New York State Court of Appeals upheld the
introduction into evidence of a gun discovered when police officers
asked a man to unzip his jacket. 100 The court held the encounter was a
inquir[y] as to [De Bour's] identity" because it was
"legitimate ...
without "harassment or intimidation," "brief," involved prevention of the
"serious crime" of narcotics, "occurred after midnight in an area known
for its high incidence of drug activity," and because "De Bour had
conspicuously crossed the street." 0 1
9 The gravamen of his dissent is that the Constitution requires probable cause. See id. at 35
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
*

Id. at 38.
But Justice Douglas does not further discuss the issue, saying only that the Terry rule

would be justified only by constitutional amendment, not by judicial decision. See id. at 39.
"

Most

states

follow

Terry. For example,

Massachusetts

follows constitutional

Terry

standards. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Mass. 2001); see also
Commonwealth v. Martin, 4 N.E.3d 1236, 1247 (Mass. 2014) ("[W]e ask whether the stop was
based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that the person was committing, had committed, or was
about to commit a crime."); Commonwealth v. Scott, 801 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Mass. 2004) ("[That]
suspicion must be grounded in "'specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences [drawn]
therefrom" rather than on a "hunch""') (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 392
(Mass. 1990) quoting Commonwealth v. Wren, 464 N.E.2d 344, 345 (Mass. 1984).
99 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
1oo

Id. at 570. De Bour and two police officers were walking toward each other just after

midnight; when the officers and De Bour were within "30 or 40 feet of the uniformed officers," De
Bour crossed the street. Id. at 565. 'The two policemen followed suit" and, upon meeting De Bour,
one officer asked him what he was doing. "De Bour, clearly but nervously, answered that he had
just parked his car and was going to a friend's house." The officer asked De Bour for identification;
De Bour said he had none. One officer then "noticed a slight waist-high bulge in [De Bour's] jacket
[and] . . asked De Bour to unzipper his coat. When De Bour complied .. . [the officer] observed a
revolver protruding from [De Bour's] waistband." At a suppression hearing, De Bour testified that
he had been patted down for "two or three minutes" before the gun was found; however, the trial

court credited the officer's testimony and the weapon was admitted into evidence. Id.
'o' Id. at 570 (emphasis added). The court, in describing the encounter, held that "the
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The crime control function of Terry stops is one of a number of
governmental interests that could potentially authorize a stop, but case
law after Terry focused increasingly narrowly on violations of criminal
law as the primary government interest. 10 2 For example, in United
10 3
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
the Court extended the rationale and basis
of Terry stops to a broader government interest: immigration control by
roving patrol "to prevent the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican
border" such that warrantless seizures, based on reasonable suspicion,
could be used. 1 0 4 In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,105 the Court found
checkpoints within 100 miles of the border to be reasonable even
without an element of suspicion in the stopping of cars. 106 These bordercontrol searches could comfortably be described as crime control
measures, and the Supreme Court accepts the governmental interest of
preventing illegal immigration. 107
2. In plain sight: Terry's explicit crime control strategy.
After Adams v. Williams,1 08 which affirmed Terry while blurring
the line between stops and protective frisks, the Court proceeded to
incrementally extend the constitutionality of Terry stops beyond the
narrow governmental interests of officer safety or border control, and,
in so doing, affirmed its crime control rationale. In Michigan v.
Summers, 109 the Court extended Terry's reach to investigative stops
encounter did not subject De Bour to a loss of dignity."
102
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967). In Brown v. Texas, the Court set out a three-pronged test to determine the constitutionality
of Terry stops: "consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." 443 U.S. 47, 50-51
(1979). This three-part test is hardly ever accomplished.
103
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
104
Id. at 879; see also id. at 878 ("As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth
Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the
public interest and the individual's rights to personal security free from arbitrary interference by
law officers.").
105 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
'0
Id. at 567. The Court balanced the intrusion created by the checkpoint, evaluated to be
considerably less than roving patrols, with the public interest in preventing illegal immigration.
The Court also noted that requiring all checkpoint stops to be based on reasonable suspicion would
be "impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of
a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens." Id. at 557.
'e
It may be more accurate to describe these border stops as investigative or detection-based:
they seek to discover illegal aliens who have already crossed the border and the smugglers who aid
them. The crimes of unauthorized entry and aiding unauthorized entry to the United States have
thus already been committed.
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
" 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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incident to a search warrant. 110 Here, a division opened within the
Court between those who would restrict Terry stops to the already
authorized safety (or border control) exceptions and those who sought
to extend Terry in favor of police action more closely in tune with a
crime control perspective. The dissenters in Summers favored the
narrower view. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, explained that "some governmental interest independent of
the ordinary interest in investigating crime and apprehending
suspects" must be important enough "to overcome the presumptive
constitutional restraints on police conduct."" The majority, however,
used the border-control-search cases to demonstrate
that the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified by
special law enforcement interests is not confined to the
momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for
weapons involved in Terry and Adams.. .. Most obvious is the
legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the
event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but
sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing
the risk of harm to the officers. 112
Over time, the Court further extended Terry's subtext authorizing
investigative stops as a crime-fighting tool, each time increasing the
scope of their permissible contexts. For example, in Michigan v.
Long, 113 the Supreme Court held that seizure of non-weapon
contraband during a weapons search of a vehicle did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 114 Minnesota u. Dickerson11 5 extended Long to
contraband found by touch during a pat down for weapons.1 16 And a
further extension of the weapons search rationale came in Maryland v.
Buie,117 where the Court authorized a "protective sweep" of an

Id. at 705.
... Id. at 707.
12
Id. at 700-02 (emphasis added). "In assessing the justification for the detention of an
occupant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, both the law
enforcement interest and the nature of the 'articulable facts' supporting the detention are
relevant." Id. at 702-03 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
11

113

463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

114

Id. at 1050.

115

508 U.S. 366 (1993).

Id. at 378-79. The seizure in that case was unlawful because, although the search was
authorized, the officer squeezed and manipulated the contraband after concluding that it was not
a weapon. It was therefore unrelated to the search for weapons and "amounted to the sort of
evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize."
116

117

494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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individual's house where he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. In
1 1 8 the Court authorized, in principle, officers in the
Hayes v. Florida,
field to take fingerprints incidental to Terry stops if the officers had a
reasonable suspicion that the individual had committed a crime.119
The final stages of Terry's expansion to crime control are evident in
the pretextual stop authorized in Whren v. United States,120 which
permits an investigative stop and search once an officer has probable
cause to believe that any crime has occurred, no matter how trivial. 121
In that case, the Court not only refused to take into account the
subjective motivation of the narcotics officers (who had used a traffic
infraction as a pretext to stop suspected drug traffickers); it also
refused to consider the argument that an objectively reasonable officer,
"acting reasonably," would not have made the stop "for the reason
given." 122 Nor did the Whren Court consider the racial lopsidedness of
the incorporation of Terry stops in the practices cited in Whren. 123 And
in Illinois v. Wardlowl24 a suspect's presence in a "high crime area" was
validated as a multiplier of less salient factors into actionable
suspicion, including facially subjective rationales such as furtive
movements or other criminal appearances. 125 Yet, neither the Wardlow
majority nor any subsequent cases attempted to standardize the
parameters of a "high crime area," completing the subjectivization of
what Terry had launched three decades earlier. 126 Judge Alex Kozinski,
dissenting in United States v. Montero-Camargo27 summed up the
Wardlow challenge in the same year: "Just as a man with a hammer

118

470 U.S. 811 (1985).

"' Id. at 817. The Court placed limits on the procedure, ruling that fingerprinting must be
"carried out with dispatch" and there must be "a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting
will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime." Id.
120 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
12
For a discussion of the racial implications of Whren, see Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1073 (2010). See also Kevin
R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song Remains the Same, in RACE LAW
STORIES (Devon Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2006).
122
123

Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.

When the petitioners in Whren introduced evidence showing that a stop for a civil traffic
violation-an expression of those non-criminal governmental interests that were foundational to
the evolution of Terry doctrine-was in fact a pretextual, race-based stop to look for drugs, the
Court thought those concerns to be beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 813. The
Whren Court failed to distinguish what was outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment-the
pretextual stop or the racial imbalance-in its application at the time.
124 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
2

Id. at 124.

Cf. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 17 (arguing that courts should use objective,
quantifiable measures to determine what qualifies as a "high-crime area").
" 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
126
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sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every
corner of his beat as a high crime area."128
3. Modern Terry doctrine.
This trajectory of cases suggests then that from the initially
delimited weapons search in Terry, intended to protect police, the Court
has thus extended the reasons for which Terry stops may be conducted
well beyond its original boundary: law enforcement can use Terry stops
to investigate future, ongoing and past crimes; to check identity, even
through fingerprinting; to search a car for identification; to search
residences for contraband and weapons; and to search luggage,
regardless of the presence of the owner. 129 By 1986, the Court had
stopped discussing the government's justification for a stop-and-search
in terms of broader government interest or of officer safety. By that
year, for example, the most detailed articulations of the crime control
functions of a Terry stop were general statements such as that in Terry
itself: "effective crime prevention and detection."1 30 Or, as in United
States v. Hensley:131 "solving crimes and bringing offenders to
justice." 132 Or, as in Florida v. Royer: 133 questioning related to "the

128

Id. at 1143 (Kosinzki, J., dissenting). Judge Kosinzki further explains:

Does an arrest every four months or so make for a high crime area? . . . [T]o rely on every
cop's repertoire of war stories to determine what is a 'high crime area'-and on that basis
to treat otherwise innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion-strikes me

as an invitation to trouble. If the testimony of two officers that they made, at most, 32
arrests during the course of a decade is sufficient to turn the road here into a high crime
area, then what area under police surveillance wouldn't qualify as one? ...

I would be

most reluctant to give police the power to turn any area into a high crime area based on
their unadorned personal experiences.

Id. (emphasis added).
129

See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: FIXING POLICING IN AMERICA (forthcoming

2017) (on file with author).
1m
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
13 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
1
Id. at 229. The Hensley Court found law enforcement interests outweighed the individual's
Fourth Amendment protection, even for past crimes:
[W]here police have been unable to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past

crime, the ability to briefly stop that person, ask questions, or check identification in the
absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and
bringing offenders to justice. Restraining police action until after probable cause is
obtained would not only hinder the investigation, but might also enable the suspect to
flee in the interim and to remain at large. Particularly in the context of felonies or
crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that the crime be
solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible.
Id.
133

460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious
crime." 134 Finally, in Floyd v. City of New York, the trial court noted
that the conduct of Terry stops as part of a crime control "program," 135
suggestive of what Justice Marshall in Florida v. Bostick 36 called a
"dragnet," 137 violated the original intent of Terry: to conduct
investigative stops to identify imminent or ongoing crimes based on
articulablebases of suspicion.
The most recent expansion of Terry's doctrine was actually not
about the parameters of suspicion, but addressed the Fourth
Amendment regulation of those boundaries, and whether a violation of
reasonable suspicion can even trigger Fourth Amendment relief. In
Utah v. Strieff,1 38 the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to evidence discovered after an unlawful stop that turned up an
outstanding arrest warrant. The most important feature of the Court's
opinion was its admission of evidence that was obtained by plainly
unconstitutional conduct. Officer James Fackrell stopped Edward
Strieff as he was leaving a residence that Fackrell believed was a drug
selling location.1 3 9 "Over the course of about a week, Officer Fackrell
conducted intermittent surveillance of the home. He observed visitors
who left a few minutes after arriving there. These visits were
sufficiently frequent to raise his suspicion that the occupants were

Id. at 499.
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 600-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also
Meares, supra note 44. Indeed, the use of Terry stops or investigative stops as a crime control
program had a long history that predated Terry. Stop-and-frisk tactics were used
programmatically in the 1960s as crime rates increased, and were targeted in poor minority
neighborhoods where they became important contributors to urban unrest. See, KERNER COMM'N,
supra note 22; see also Robert M. Fogelson, From Resentment to Confrontation: The Police, the
Negroes, and the Outbreak of the Nineteen-Sixties Riots, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 217, 217-18 (1968)
(linking the urban riots in the 1960s to a string of "extraordinary and unjustified police actions").
136 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
137 Id. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The broad range of
modern searches under Terry's
crime control rationale, including programs like stop and frisk in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
and Philadelphia, and a wide range of administrative searches including checkpoints and school
sweeps, all express the crime control and deterrence rationales that were incubated in Terry and
developed over the next five decades. These developments all were done without democratic
regulation or political processes. See, e.g., DAVID SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008)
(arguing that the democratization of the police, not regulation by courts, will produce more
effective and accountable policing); Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV.
761, 777 (2012) (emphasizing that constitutional law cannot fully address problems of police
regulation); Carl McGowan, Rule-making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1974) (arguing
that police departments, not courts, should formulate rules to govern policing); Christopher
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Non-delegation Doctrine, 102
GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014) (arguing that ordinary democratic processes of legislative authorization and
police rulemaking should govern panvasive searches and seizures).
138
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016)
1"9 Id. at 2060.
134

135
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dealing drugs." 14 0 Fackrell's conclusions about the illegal activity at
that spot were based on an anonymous call to a "drug-tip line" and
Fackrell's own personal experience.14 1 Once stopped, Fackrell
discovered that Strieff had a "small" outstanding arrest warrant for a
traffic violation. 142 Conducting a search incident to arrest, Fackrell
discovered drug paraphernalia and amphetamine in Strieff's pockets.
The Strieff Court recognized that the stop was unconstitutional. 14 3
So did the Utah Supreme Court, which had nullified the arrest on the
drug charges. 144 But, because that conduct was (in the eyes of the
Court) neither intentional nor flagrant, the evidence was admitted.
Applying an attenuation doctrine that severed the police conduct from
the causal chain between the stop and the seizure, the evidence was
allowed to stand. The decision seems to go in two directions at once.
The Court recognized that the discovery of the warrant was
unforeseeable: there are no behavioral indicia that someone may have
an outstanding warrant, nor was that condition noted in prior cases as
a sign, as the Terry Court required, that "crime is afoot."14 5 But the
Court also wanted to allow the reasonableness of the stop and warrant
check, despite the fact that the discovery of an outstanding warrant
was unforeseeable. It is rare, except in extraordinary circumstances as
in the Ferguson investigation, 14 6 to discover an outstanding warrant
during a routine pedestrian or traffic stop. 14 7 In dissent, Justice
Sotomayor characterized the warrant check as "part and parcel of the
officer's illegal 'expedition for evidence in the hope that something
might turn up."'14 8 Perhaps most important, the attenuation doctrine
applied by the Strieff Court essentially scrubs out reasonableness from
the Terry formula.

140

Id. at 2059.

141

Id.
State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev'd, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
136 S. Ct. at 2061.

142
143

145

357 P. 3d at 544.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968)

146

U.S.

144

DEP'T. OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE

https: //www.justice.gov/sites/default /files/opalpress-releases/
(2015),
55
47,
DEPARTMENT
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson-police-department-report.pf [https://perma.cc/8QX8-JMCN].
147
Brief of Dr. Ian Ayres et al. in Support of Petitioner, Petition for Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at 6-8, United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009
(8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-235), 2011 WL 4479100, at *6-8.

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v.
148
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-05 (1975)).
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Justice Sotomayor goes further, claiming that this is hardly an
"isolated" event that the Strieff majority claims. 149 She describes the
same decades of expansion of the Terry logic to justify widespread
investigative stops of both pedestrians and vehicles, 150 and the risks of
humiliating intrusions and abuses during these now routine contacts. 5 1
She goes on to describe the racial skew in the risks of these contacts,
describing a "double consciousness" of race and criminality that is
instantiated in black and Latino youths. 152
D.

Gains and Losses After Terry

The majority of opinions of the courts in the stop-and-frisk cases
that followed Terry, as well as recent legal scholarship, argue, "Terry's
regime of stop-and-frisk may well be critical to the fight against violent
crime. For that reason, the law enforcement benefits of Terry seem
substantial, and the intrusion on liberty that it authorizes seems
relatively limited." 153 Yet there has been remarkably little empirical
analysis of Terry's crime control contributions. This crime control
agenda, and its claims of efficacy in reducing crime, provides the
rationale then to test Terry's effects on crime.
This essay starts with the notion that, searching for a crime control
rationale to justify a broad standard for police intrusions via street
stops, Terry's original sin was forgoing a probable cause standard for
investigative stops and substituting an inchoate standard, a standard
that is inherently subjective and prone to cognitive distortion, bias and
error. Somewhere between that elastic Terry standard in practice
today-a practice that often instantiates into policy and program the
hunches that so worried the Terry Court-and Mapp's probable cause
standard, lies a threshold of suspicion that can do three things: avoid
the petty indignities that have become commonplace in the "new
policing," 15 4 avoid the burdens on the innocents of inefficient stops and
intrusions that consume both police resources and citizen trust, 15 5 and
149

Id. at 2068-69.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 2069-71.

'5' Id.; see also I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 44
(2009).
"' See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race and the Case against Terry v.
Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 329-30 (2010). However, the intrusions may be anything but
"relatively limited."
"4 See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness and the Unrecognized
Point of a "Pointless Indignity," 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1013-14 (2014); see generally Phillip B.
Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000).
155 See Stuntz, supra note 42.
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contribute substantially to Terry's crime control agenda. The empirical
data in this paper seek out that threshold.
III. EMPIRICAL DETAMLS
A.

Data and Measures

Data produced in the litigation in Floyd v. City of New York were
re-analyzed to address these questions. 15 6 The study period was 2004
though 2012, a lengthy interval to examine trends by month that were
sensitive to changes in police stop-and-frisk practices. The data
included geocoded records of each stop, which were aggregated to
generate counts of stops within police precincts and census block
groups for each month. 157 The stop data also included police reports of
the crime suspected in each stop. These included 133 codes that were
reduced to seven categories that reflected the crime categories of
interest in the policy debate in New York on the stop regime. 15 8 Crime
counts were estimated from crimes reported to the police and geocoded
to the nearest street block. These crime reports were then aggregated
to generate counts of suspected crimes within precincts and census
block groups for each month. The rationales for these units of analysis
are discussed infra. The classification categories are shown in Appendix
A.
Census data from the 2008 American Community Survey (the
midpoint of the time series) were used to generate an empirical
description of the social, economic, and demographic conditions for each
census block. Although the use of a single time point omits changes in
the economic and demographic characteristics of these census blocks
during the time-period, only a small portion of the 6475 census block
groups were changing dynamically during this interval. I address the
effects that temporal trends in areas could have on my estimates by
including a linear time trend for each police precinct-month. Precincts
are administrative units encompassing census block groups and are
156

Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). As part of discovery in the

litigation, data were provided to plaintiffs on stops, crimes, and arrests for each year in the study

period.
157 Census block groups are small statistical and spatial divisions of census tracts. They range
in size from 600 to 3000 persons. Block groups cover contiguous areas, and are always located

within a census tract (never crossing tract boundaries). The boundaries are defined by streets or

highways, railroads, streams, and other bodies of water, and/or other visible physical and cultural
features.

See U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

GEOGRAPHIC

TERMS

AND

CONCEPTS-BLOCK

GROUPS,

https: /www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc /gtc-bg.html [https://perma.cc/2EPJ-TQCY].
" See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 580-81; see also Fagan Report, supra note 54; Fagan
Supplemental Report, supra note 54.
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substantively important, as this is the spatial unit where uniformed
police officers are assigned, and crime control strategies are
implemented and managed.
The nine law-defined categories of suspicion that police marked on
each stop form were used to state the bases of reasonable suspicion for
each stop. 1 5 9 The boxes included affirmative stop rationales plus an
option to check "other" and record the specifics by hand. 160 The nine
rationales incorporated a set of behavioral categories based on both
state and federal case law that would survive a Fourth Amendment
test for the individualized stop rationales. 161 Officers could check as
many boxes as needed to express the basis for the stop. Table 1 lists the
categories available for officers to mark the bases of suspicion. In about
ninety-five percent of the stops from 2004-2012, officers checked from
one to six factors, creating 60,459 possible combinations that express
the bases of suspicion for this subset.
Table 1. Specific Stop Circumstances and Percent
Based on Each Factor
% of
Factor
Stops
Furtive Movements
54.9%
Casing
28.8%
Other Stop Circumstance
20.2%
Evasive Actions
17.1%
Fits Description
17.0%
Carrying Crime Objects in Plain View
12.7%
Drug Transaction
9.3%
Suspicious Bulge
8.9%
Actions Indicate Violent Crime
8.0%
N= 4,575,787
Note: The total exceeds 100 percent due to multiple
stop factors indicated per incident.
Source: NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Database, various years.
Three of the nine factors describe observable suspect behaviors
that approximate criminal activity: (1) actions indicative of engaging in

15
See Fagan Report, supra note 54, at 22. The checkboxes were incorporated into the
standard reporting form for stops, the UF-250. They were a set of indicia of suspicion derived from
the aggregate experiences of officers who had been conducting stops over many years. See id. at
48-49.
'"

Id. at 22.

See id. at Appendix F; see also Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 10 Civ. 0699) (hereinafter Fagan Davis Report); Fagan & Geller, supra note 72.
161
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drug transaction, (2) actions indicative of violent crimes, or (3) "casing"
victim or location. 162 These factors on their face approximated a
probable cause basis for a Terry stop. Each factor is narrow and
behaviorally specific, avoiding the vagueness and subjectivity that
worried the Terry Court 63 and that has translated into recurring
constitutional challenges based on Fourth Amendment violations. 164 We
have only vague ideas about how police discretion is managed in
deciding who to stop, and even less information on what exactly they
are looking for when they think an action or person looks suspicious.1

65

While there may be no algorithm to explain how police determinations
of suspicious behavior are formed, there are at least observable
patterns. The worry in this regime is about unconscious patterns, often
racialized, that shape the formation of suspicion based on archetypes
such as the "symbolic assailant" and other processes that shape
cognition and interpretation of behavioral cues. 166 Symbolic cues are
clearly problematic, as they have no legal justification.
Judicial opinions make clear that stops based on observations of
actions indicative of criminal behavior are constitutional. Actions
indicative of a drug transaction that can survive a prima facie claim of
probable cause include observed exchange of currency or an object that
might contain drugs. 167 Some case law suggests that these actions are
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968) (upholding stop and frisk when officer
suspected three men of casing a store in preparation for a daytime robbery); United States v.
Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a detective's observation of two men
quietly following another individual into a secluded area in the dark and out of the individual's
peripheral vision "supported the detective's suspicion that the two men might have been targeting
the disheveled man for a robbery" and justified a stop and frisk); People v. Richard, 668 N.Y.S.2d
386, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("Reasonable suspicion supporting the forcible detention of
162

defendant was supplied by lengthy police observations of defendant's complex, unusual, and
suspicious pattern of 'casing'-type behavior, strongly suggestive of a known series of armed

robberies in the neighborhood that targeted movie theaters in particular, coupled with the fact
that defendant met a general description of one of the robbers.").
163

See Stuntz, supra note 42. In Brown v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas's

stop-and-identify law as violating the Fourth Amendment because it allowed police officers to stop
individuals without "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved
in criminal activity." 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see also Fagan & Geller, supra note 72.
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
164
61 See William H. Simon, Rethinking Privacy, BOSTON REv. (Oct. 20, 2014), https://boston
[https://perma.cc/X6GDreview.net/books-ideas/william-simon-rethinking-privacy-surveillance
F2EP].
16
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 802 (1999); see also Fagan & Geller, supra note 72.
See, e.g., People v. Sierra, 683 N.E.2d 955, 956 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that officers had
16'
reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect calling "over here, over here" in an area known for drug

trafficking who subsequently fled upon noticing the officers). But see People v. Thompson, No.
2002-1635, 2004 LEXIS 873 (N.Y. App. Div. June 9, 2004) (holding that an officer did not have the
authority to request that a suspect reveal what was in his hand because the suspect engaged in
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indicia of criminal drug transactions only if they take place in a "drugprone" location, although courts have never clarified the meaning of a
"drug-prone" location. 168 For example, the Strieff Court questioned the
formation of suspicion by Officer Fackrell that a particular residence
was a "drug location" based on an anonymous tip to a "drug-tip" line
about "narcotics activity at a particular residence." 169 Other courts have
ruled that a suspected drug transaction with specific behavioral indicia
may justify a field interrogation but, absent other factors, cannot justify
a frisk. 170
Although "casing" can describe a number of different and
potentially innocuous behaviors, actions legitimately indicative of
casing either a victim or a location can justify a stop and frisk. 17 1
Reasonable suspicion that a person may have been involved in a violent
crime can support a stop and frisk, even without other evidence of
actual violent or otherwise dangerous behavior. 172 So too can threats of
"some sort of exchange" in a drug prone location).
168
See, e.g., People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that a transaction that
(a) involved the exchange of currency, (b) took place in a drug-prone location, and (c) was observed
by an experienced officer who was trained in the investigation and detection of narcotics,
supported a finding of probable cause).
1
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016) (disputing the reasonableness of Officer
Fackrell's seizure of Edward Strieff based on his presence at a location where Fackrell suspected
that drugs were being sold).
170 Despite the purported link between guns and drugs that the Court assumed in this case,
the fact that a suspect might have participated in a drug transaction does not instantly ensure
that an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect has committed a crime and a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed or dangerous. But compare People v. Perolta-Rua,
579 N.Y.S.2d 283, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that experienced officer's knowledge "that
drug dealers often carry weapons" was one factor supporting stop and frisk), with United States v.
Gonzalez, 362 F. Supp. 415, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (deciding, under New York law, that stop and
frisk was improper because "[n]one of the agents who testified expressed any concern that Torres
might be armed and dangerous, and it is evident, even from their own testimony, that they
grabbed his paper bag because they hoped to find narcotics, not a weapon").
"7' See Ohio v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), aff'd, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In the
original stop of John Terry, Officer Martin McFadden observed Terry and Richard Chilton, pacing
back and forth in front of a jewelry store in Cleveland's commercial district for twelve minutes
before closing time. When Terry and Chilton were joined by a third man, Officer McFadden began
a field interrogation. Terry's mumbled responses further raised McFadden's suspicion and led to a
pat down and then search of Terry's clothing that produced a loaded automatic gun. The Terry
Court celebrated Officer McFadden's experience as sharpening his ability to distinguish innocuous
behavior from his decision that crime was "afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968).
172
See People v. Mack, 258 N.E.2d 703, 707 (N.Y. 1970) ("Where ... the officer confronts an
individual whom he reasonably suspects has committed, is committing or is about to commit such
a serious and violent crime as robbery or, as in the instant case, burglary, then it is our opinion
that that suspicion not only justifies the detention but also the frisk, thus making it unnecessary
to particularize an independent source for the belief of danger."); see also People v. Schollin, 682
N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (upholding pat down of suspect when officer believed that
victim had been shot in face); People v. Paul, 658 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(upholding stop and frisk where officers heard numerous gunshots and saw two persons running
from location where shots were fired).
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violence.17 3 Still, actions short of behavioral indicia of imminent or
ongoing violence run the risk of vague and subjective interpretation by
police contemplating a stop, and courts have urged caution in making
the leap from "furtive movements" or "evasive actions" to violent
crime. 174
The behavioral grounding of these three categories provides little
room for cognitive error or perceptual distortion, and is consistent with
state and federal case law on probable cause.17 5 In addition, courts have
said that observed criminal behavior is sufficient on its own to justify a
police stop. 176 In contrast, the other six categories of suspicion in these
data require subjective judgments and attributions of intent: (1) furtive
movements, (2) fits descriptions, (3) carrying objects in plain view, (4)
suspicious bulge, (5) evasive actions, or (6) "other."17 7 In contrast to
observations of specific criminal activity, these factors are vulnerable to
cognitive bias and error, as well as racialized attributions of suspicion
or criminality. 178

1
See People v. Mitchell, 601 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (upholding search of
suspect's suitcase when woman told officers that suspect had verbally threatened to shoot her with
shotgun).
17
See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding that police had
no reasonable suspicion to frisk suspect who repeatedly looked up and down the street and down
subway stairs at 10:00 P.M. in high-crime area and who had reached into his jacket several times);
see also People v. Alvarez, 778 N.Y.S.2d 27, 27-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (finding that pat down
was proper where, inter alia, police responded to radio call based on anonymous tip, heard
suspicious noises coming from apartment, and witnessed suspect attempting to flee scene by
climbing a fence. Given the vagueness of this standard, it is impossible to say whether a "sight" or
"sound," standing alone, would justify a stop and frisk.).
17
Fagan Report, supra note 54, at 40-53.
176
See Opinion and Order, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 08 Civ. 1034), at 579-80.
177
Fagan & Geller, supra note 72. "Other" stop factors were checked off at frequencies that
varied by type of suspected crime. The content of the text strings that accompanied this factor was
analyzed as part of expert reports in litigation. See Fagan Supplemental Report, supra note 54.
The text strings for the "other" factor were a diverse set of observations that were at times specific
(e.g., "smell of marijuana smoke") and at times bizarrely vague (e.g., "looks like a perp"). See
Fagan Davis Report, supra note 161. There was no discernable pattern that would sustain
meaningful disaggregation or classification. When applied to judgments about the constitutional
sufficiency of a stop event, they were far more likely to lead to a conclusion of "indeterminate" or
"insufficient."
" See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Context and Cognition
in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 99-102 (2012); see also Geoffrey P.
Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making during Citizen Stops, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 422-23 (2005) (showing that whether a suspect is black influences an officer's
decision to form suspicion based on non-behavioral versus behavioral cues); Adam M. Samaha,
Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1620-34 (2012) (describing the
New York stop-and-frisk regime as "appearance-based" regulation based on perceptions of
disorderly places or people); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows", 67 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 319,
330-34 (2004) (showing empirically that perception of disorder in neighborhoods is correlated not
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By hiving off the three categories of suspicion that are closer in
meaning to a probable cause standard, the empirical strategy here is to
determine how the use of these three categories of stops influences
crime rates, net of other social and crime conditions. I estimate the
number of probable and non-probable cause stops in each census block
group each month to assess their separate and combined effects on
crimes in later months.
B.

Empirical Strategy

All statistical models were estimated as Poisson regressions with
standard errors clustered by block groups to control for unmeasured
variation and correlation within block groups.17 9 The regressions
include a measure of the total stop, question, and frisk activity (SQF)
per month and a measure of the subset of stops based on "probable
cause" justifications. A separate parameter for each month-precinct is
included to control for separate trends within the larger precinct units
in which block groups are nested. Precincts are relevant as the
management unit to supervise officers and deploy them to locales
within the precincts. Assignments of officers change each month within
precincts, if not more frequently, based on decisions made by precinct
commanders.
The model takes the form:
- Ji + Xp,(i),t +

iDi pt +

P 2 Pi + 03Si+

0 4D*Pit + P 5D*Si + P6X

+

(1) Yi,b,t
Si,p,t

where Yi,b,t is the number of crimes in block group i located in
precinct p in month t, Ap(i),t is a measure of the crime rate in the block
group the month before, D measures the number of stop factors
indicated in stops, P measures the percent of probable cause stops, and
S measures the total number of stops made in the block group in a
month. For this model the parameter (3) for S is constrained to equal
one, so that P and D become rates per overall stop in each block
month. 180 The regression model also includes a time trend for the
month-precinct. An interaction (D*P) between the number of probable
cause stops and the average total of stop factors indicated in each stop
is also included.

only with observation of disorder but also with the racial composition of the neighborhood).
17
Richard A. Berk & John M. MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression,
24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 269, 271-72 (2008).

a

John M. MacDonald & Pamela K. Lattimore, Count Models in Criminology, in HANDBOOK

OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (Alex R. Piquero & David Weisburd eds., 2010).
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In this model, X represents a set of control variables measuring
local social conditions, including racial composition (percent black,
percent Hispanic), poverty, age structure, immigrant concentration,
average educational attainment, and the housing vacancy rate. These
are measured for the midpoint of the time series, 2009, using census
data from the American Community Survey's five-year estimates.18 1 I
also control for block groups in low-crime and low-population business
districts, where cues of suspicion leading to stops may be more likely to
be formed based on observations of individuals' behaviors and not
priming from the local neighborhood context. 182
The initial specifications estimate effects with lags of two months
and leads of two months. This empirical strategy allows me to estimate
the effects of stops net of the threats of reverse causation. The forward
lag, or lead, tests the sensitivity of the results against spuriousness
owing to temporal order 83 or the possibility of regression to the
mean.1 84 Blocks may receive an increase in overall stops due to a recent
crime spike, so that mean reversion would lead to upwardly biased
estimates in the regressions of monthly crime rates. To test for residual
effects of stops on crime over a longer time-period the models are also
estimated with six-month leads and lags.
IV. RESULTS

There are 6,495 census block groups in New York City, as of the
2010 decennial census. 85 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the
city's block groups. The average residential population is 1,348.9
persons located in land areas averaging 0.047 square miles.1 86 The
racial and ethnic population characteristics suggest the diversity of the
city's population, with percent Non-Hispanic white, Non-Hispanic
black, and Hispanic populations nearly equally distributed. Non''
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA
https: //www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/news/data-releases.2009.html

RELEASES

(2009)

[https://perma.cc/Y9MF-N2BT].
182
See Fagan Report, supra note 54, at Tables 7 and 8 for examples of the sensitivity of
estimates of Terry stop patterns when controlling for these non-residential local conditions.

'83 See, e.g., Christopher Wildemann, Paternal Incarceration and Children's Physically
Aggressive Behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, 89 SOC.
FORCES 285, 293 (2010).
184 See Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of
Earnings to
Estimate the Effect of Training Programs,67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 648 (1985).
'88 Census 2010, SOCIAL EXPLORER, http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C2010/R11091839
[https://perma.cc/YP2W-83VC].
18
The standard deviation for the land area is .738 square miles with a median size of .025
square miles, indicating a wide range of sizes and densities of census block groups. Many of the
larger block groups are commercial or industrial areas with very low populations.
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Table 2. Block Group Descriptive Statistics
Mean
1348.9

Std. Dev.
625.5

44.6
25.1
27.5
11.8

31.2
31.0
26.7
17.5

29.5
36.8

20.9
22.4

9.1

8.2

5.1
21.6
30,717.5

6.1
15.6
27,815.4

4.1
1.7

9.3
4.4

Violent - Felony
Property - Felony

1.1
0.8

1.7
1.6

Drug Crimes

0.4

1.0

0.06

0.3

Total Population
Racial and Ethnic Composition
% White NH
% Black NH
% Hispanic
% Other NH
Highest Education
% > High School Grads
% College Degree +
Housing
Vacancy Rate
Income and Poverty
% Public Assistance
% Below Poverty
Per Capita Income ($)
Stops
Stops per Month
PC Stops per Month
Crime per Month

Other - Felony

Weapons
0.1
0.4
Misdemeanors
2.2
3.5
0.6
1.1
Violations
N of Block Groups
6475
Source: American Community Survey, 2006-10 Estimates;
New York City Police Department, Crime Complaints, various years;
New York City Police Department, Stop and Frisk Data, various years.
Hispanic whites are a plurality at 33.3%. Asians comprise 12.6% of the
city's population, the majority of the "Other Race" group of 15.3%. More
than one in three adults over the age of twenty-five has a college degree
or post-graduate study, and about one in five (22.4%) did not graduate
from high school. One in five (21.6%) households live below the
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federally defined poverty threshold. Median per-capita income is
$30,718 per year. The housing vacancy rate, a correlate of crime,18 7
averages 9.1% of total housing units in the block group.
Indicia of crime and enforcement also show considerable range and
skew by census block group. Monthly crime counts appear low at first
glance, but when aggregated across census block groups each month,
the crime counts add up. The standard deviations again show the skew
in these crime counts. Terry stops per month average 4.1 stops, with a
standard deviation of 9.3. Of those stops, about half (46.1%) fit the
definition of "probable cause" stops (hereinafter PC stops), with a
standard deviation of 4.4. Figure 1 shows the distribution of PC and
"non-probable cause" stops (hereafter NPC stops) per month over the
nine-year period. PC stops were less frequent than NPC stops for
nearly every month in the time series until May 2012. In that month,
the counts of PC and NPC stops evened out, and the total number of
stops declined sharply. The onset of the decline coincided with a class
certification ruling in the Floyd litigation that allowed the litigation to
proceed to trial.18 8

Figure 1. Probable Cause and Non-Probable Cause
Stops per Month, New York City, 2004-12
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.. See Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and
Urban Crime, 75 Soc. FORCES 619, 634 (1996); see also Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure,
Vacancy and Crime, 87 J. URB. ECON. 72, 75 (2015).
See Opinion and Order, supra note 176 (ruling that plaintiffs satisfied the standards for
188
class certification under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy) (citing Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v.
Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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The specific stop circumstances that officers mark down for each
stop were shown earlier in Table 1. Of the 46.1% that are classified as
PC stops, more than half are based on suspicion of "casing," the same
circumstance that animated the 1963 stop of John Terry.18 9 A judgment
that a suspect is casing a person or a location requires a subjective
assessment and interpretations of specific behaviors that may be
precursors of a crime. Of the three categories of PC stops, this is the
most subjective. Suspicion under this category that rises to the level of
action by an officer should require a lengthy period of police
observation of the suspect or suspects in order to rule out innocent or
casual actions and to show that the behavior is sustained over more
than just a few minutes. The judgment requires more cognitive work
than do judgments based on the other categories, where the behaviors
may be more repetitive across events and circumstances, and where the
actions and gestures are less ambiguous.1 90 And that cognitive work
also can offset implicit biases in perception that can infect
instantaneous or snap judgments of suspect actions, biases based on
place, race, or archetypes such as the symbolic assailant.191 In contrast,
"furtive movements," marked as the basis of suspicion in movements,
comprise half of the police stops in 2004-12, and represent the most
vague and subjective indicia of suspicion. 192
Next, Table 3 reports the results of regressions showing the effects
of PC stops on crime. Two different model specifications regressions
were estimated. The first analyzed the effects of PC stops alone on six
different types of crime, with total number of both PC and NPC stops
as a control variable. The second version analyzed the effects of PC
stops controlling not only for the total number of stops, but also
including a measure of the average number of indicia of suspicion
marked in the stops conducted in each block group-month observation.

189

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).

As in money changing hands.
See, e.g., Fagan & Geller, supra note 72; Samaha, supranote 178; Sampson & Raudenbush,
supra note 178.
192 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 8, 11, 41, 43-45, n.760 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(reporting testimony from officers explaining that "furtive movement is a very broad concept," and
could include a person "changing direction," "walking in a certain way," "[a]cting a little
suspicious," "making a movement that is not regular," being "very fidgety," "going in and out of his
pocket," "going in and out of a location," 'looking back and forth constantly," 'looking over their
shoulder," "adjusting their hip or their belt," "moving in and out of a car too quickly," "[t]urning a
part of their body away from you," "[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist,"
"getting a little nervous, maybe shaking" and "stutter [ing]," "hanging out in front of [a] building,
sitting on the benches or something like that" and then making a "quick movement," such as
"bending down and quickly standing back up," "going inside the lobby ... and then quickly coming
back out," or "all of a sudden becom[ing] very nervous, very aware").
190
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193

See, e.g.,

JOSEPH HILBE,

NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION

111-12

(2011);

Berk

&

In other words, this second estimate represents the effects of PC stops
controlling for the totality of suspicion applied by officers in making PC
stops in each block-group month. The results are reported as Incident
Rate Ratios (IRR). An IRR expresses the change in the dependent
variable given a change in the value of the predictor, with a mean of 1.0
indicating no change.1 93
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the effects of PC stops alone on
crime. These estimates examine crimes with a lag and lead of two
months. Each model is significant, although the large number of
observations (6490 block groups for 108 months) reduces the
importance of significance as a measure of model strength. More
important are the effect sizes. The IRR estimates range from .924 for
violent crimes to .969 for weapons offenses. Interpreting the IRR
estimates as rates of change, these models show that for every increase
of one PC stop, the various crime types will decline in each block group
by anywhere from roughly three percent to seven percent. These are
average effects across the block groups of the city over the 108 months
of the study interval.

MacDonald, supra note 179; Sander Greenland, Dose-Response and Trend Analysis in
Epidemiology: Alternatives to CategoricalAnalysis, 6 EPIDEMIOLOGY 356, 359 (1996).
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The lower panel of Table 3 shows the effects of PC stops interacted
with the total number of stop factors marked by an officer in those
stops, or the total quantity of suspicion in each case. The results are
again significant in all models, and the IRR estimates this time are
larger, ranging from .836 for weapons offenses to .680 for property
crimes. Translating this into effect sizes, these estimates show
reductions for each increase in PC stops from 16.2% for weapons
offenses to approximately 32% for property and violent crimes. Again,
these are average monthly effects across the block groups. In an era of
declining crime rates in the city, 1 94 these effects based on stop type are
quite large. The implication as well is that higher concentrations of
NPC stops are unproductive and add nothing to the crime control
efforts of law enforcement.
The concentration of PC stops varied in each block-group- month.
The range of PC stop concentration raises the question of threshold
effects. At what point do crime rates deflect downward as the
concentration of PC stops increases? Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the
marginal effects of PC stops at ten percent intervals in the distribution
of PC stops. Marginal effects are the values of a predictor variable on
the dependent variable in a regression that is estimated from the
specific or fixed values of that predictor with the other predictors held
constant at their means or averages. 195 In this case, marginal effects
are estimated on total crime for each ten percent increment of the
percentage of PC stops in a block group-month. Each figure corresponds
to the two regression strategies reported in Table 3: PC stops as a
predictor (Figure 2.1), and PC stops plus total suspicion as a predictor
(Figure 2.2).

&

194 See NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, HISTORICAL NEW YORK CITY CRIME DATA,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis-and-planning/historical-nyc-crime-data.shtml
[https://perma.cc/PY6T-RWD7].
'9 Richard Williams, Using the Margins Command to Estimate and Interpret Adjusted
Predictionsand Marginal Effects, 12 STATA J. 308, 323-24 (2012); see also Michael J. Hanmer
Kerem 0. Kalkan, Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted
Probabilitiesand Marginal Effects From Limited Dependent Variable Models, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI.
263, 275 (2013).
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Figure 2.1- Effects of PC Stops on Crime with 95% CI

CO

E

01
C

'

IIllit

1 Opct

20pct

30pct

40pct

50pct

60pct

70pct

80pct

90pct

PC Stops Percentile

Figure 2.2 - Effects of PC Stops and Total Suspicion
on Crime with 95% C1
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Each figure shows that the crime reduction effects of PC stop
concentration increase beginning when these stops exceed fifty percent
of all stops in a block-group-month. The effects are stable and modest
up to a fifty percent concentration of PC stops, and then increase at
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successive increments. The sharpest increase in crime reduction is at
the highest concentrations of PC stops. Figure 2.1 shows that the
marginal effects increase from about 1.75 fewer crimes at fifty percent
to over two crimes per block group-month with a sharp increase from
eighty percent to ninety percent. These are the effects attributable to
PC stops and do not reflect other factors related to crime reductions,
which the marginal effect model averages over the full range of PC
stops in the marginal effects model. Figure 2.2 shows the same pattern.
Estimates of the effects of PC stops together with total suspicion across
those stops are stable up to a fifty percent concentration, and increase
at each successive increment. The largest increase in marginal effects
is at the last increment, from eighty percent to ninety percent.
These analyses show the short-term effects of PC stop
concentration at two month projections. This form of residual effect
could decay over time as would-be offenders adjust to the increased risk
of being stopped by the police, or as police officers rotate into and out of
patrol assignments which can interrupt their learning and updating of
their practices. An important question, then, is what are the residual
effects of PC stop concentrations over longer intervals? 196 To test for
residual effects, the models in Table 3 were re-estimated in Table 4.
Table 4 shows only the IRR for total crime and six specific categories of
crime using a six-month lag and lead time parameter. The panel on the
left of the table shows the IRR for PC stops only after six months; the
panel on the right shows the effects of PC stops plus the totality of
suspicion in those stops.
Table 4 and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that for both PC stops and
PC stops with total suspicion, the crime reduction effects at six months
are similar to the effects at two months. There are small and negligible
differences in the effect sizes from two to six months for both sets of
models. PC stops produce a 6.6% decline in total crime, and crimespecific reductions ranging from 7.7% for violent crime to 3.1% for
weapons offenses. The reductions in total crime for PC stops with total
suspicion are nearly 30%, with crime-specific reductions ranging from
16.5% for weapons offenses to 32.3% for property crimes. These
percentages are based on generally low offense counts, but these
monthly reductions aggregate over time to produce important and
sizable safety benefits.

'" See Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME

& JUST. 1, 11-12 (1990) (showing that the majority of empirical studies on police "crackdowns" or
concentrated patrol strategies report initial but not long-term deterrent effects on crime after two

months, despite continued patrol pressures and allocations of officers over a longer interval).
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Figure 3. 1. Poisson Regression of Probable Cause Stops on Crime
with 6 Month Lead and Lag (IRR, 95% Cl)
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Figure 3.2. Poisson Regression of Probable Cause Stops with
Total Suspicion on Crime with 6 Month Lead and Lag
(IRR, 95% CI)
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The comparative advantage in crime reduction benefits of focusing
stops on indicia of suspicion that are more closely aligned with probable
cause and behavioral markers are evident in these analyses. It would
be important to identify the underlying mechanisms for these effects,
but that would require a very different and ethically challenging
research enterprise, including strong identification strategies that
account for concurrent sources of deterrence, as well as testing the
specific underlying mechanisms of deterrence. 197 For now, it is not hard
to imagine that by narrowing the scope of suspicion to behaviors more
closely aligned with criminal activities, the emphasis on accuracy
allows the signals of deterrence to be aimed more directly and less
speculatively or subjectively at persons who may be deciding about a
possible crime. Contemporary theories of deterrence agree that the
risks of detection and apprehension are essential to effective
deterrence. 198
V. REDEEMING THE ORIGINAL SIN
There are tradeoffs in crime returns-shown here and in other
studies assessing the effects of probable cause stops 1 99-when stop
regimes lean heavily on subjective or inchoate indicia of suspicion over
more objective behavioral markers. This tradeoff is one part of Terry's
original sin. Officers can play hunches, but at a price. The original sin
then, was less a question of moving away from Mapp's probable cause
standard than it was inviting police to use their authority to conduct
temporary detentions and investigations based on the very hunches
that worried the Terry Court. 200
The Terry Court, and subsequent Fourth Amendment opinions,
chose to define neither the substantive criteria of reasonable suspicion,
nor how much suspicion is required for police officers to conduct an

197

See generally Robert Apel, On the Deterrent Effects of Stop, Question, and Frisk, 15

CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 27 (2016).

See Daniel Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201
(2013) (reviewing empirical and theoretical scholarship on deterrence over the past three decades);
see also Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence, in CRIME
AND PUBLIC POLICY (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011);
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
Investigation, 24 O.J.L.S. 173 (2004) (articulating the behavioral mechanisms of deterrence).
'9
See, e.g., John MacDonald et al., The Effects of Local Police Surges on Crime and Arrests in
New York City, 6 PLoS ONE, e0157223 11 (2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?
id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0157223 [https://perma-archives.org/warc/W7KN-GEVN].
2" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) ("The officer must be able to articulate more than an
'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch' of criminal activity." The officer's intuitions,
gut feelings, and "sixth sense" about a situation are disallowed.); see also Craig S. Lerner,
Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 419 (2006).
198
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investigative stop. 2 0 1 Even when courts exercised caution in expressing
what is reasonable suspicion, the standards often were simply an
elongated expression of Terry's binary approach distinguishing
reasonable suspicion from probable cause. 202 For example, New York
State standards are more demanding than the standards in other
states for investigative stopS 20 3 as well as the Terry standard, yet the
De Bour and Holman courts in New York defaulted to a subjective
cascade of four increasing levels of intrusion. 204 Redemption for Terry's
sins can come in two forms.
A.

Terry at Fifty

Whether in the binary or a more detailed articulation of reasonable
suspicion such as De Bour, the Terry component of the new policing
seems, as practiced, to have failed at least the crime control prong of
Terry's balancing test.2 05 Along the way, Terry's failure to provide
substance or quantity to the concept of actionable "suspicion" created a
subjective terrain that invited police to use broad assessments of

201

See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(discussing the vague empirical

standards to determine

whether the criteria of reasonable

suspicion in vehicle or pedestrian stops as applied is "reasonable"); see also City of Indianapolis v.
Edmund, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (stating that a "hit rate" of approximately nine percent at a
random checkpoint does not justify a general purpose of stopping vehicles in a search for criminal
activity).
202 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) ("The principal components [of
reasonable suspicion] . . ." are "the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search" and

"the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion[.]").
203 For example, Massachusetts follows constitutional

standards

in Terry v.

Ohio. See

Commonwealth v. Torres, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Mass. 2001); see also supra note 98.
204 Tilem & Associates, New York Search and Seizure Law: Street Encounters with Police in
CRIM. ATT'Y BLOG, http://www.
New
York The Four Levels of Intrusion, N.Y.
[https: //
newyorkcriminalattorneyblog.com/2010/01/new-york-search-andseizure-la-1.html

perma.cc/NLR3-E4MD]. People v. De Bour specifies four distinct levels of intrusion by a police
officer, each linked to a permissible response. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 213 (N.Y. 1976). (1) Approaching a
suspect to request information through non-threatening questions requires an objective or credible

reason to interact with the suspect. See People v. Hollman & Saunders, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184 (N.Y.
1992). (2) Asking pointed questions that might lead an officer to believe that the person is
suspected of a crime is based on the common law right of inquiry, and requires founded suspicion.
See id. at 185. (3) A stop, or temporary but forcible detention, requires reasonable suspicion.
Reasonable suspicion can also justify a frisk, if the officer fears that the suspect has a weapon.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2010); see also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
(4) Arrest and full search of a suspect requires probable cause. See United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 432 (1976); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
205
Terry's balancing test was cast in 1968 as weighing the level of intrusion on the citizen
versus the officer safety concerns. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); see Rosenthal, supra note
153. But over time, the balancing test devolved into crime control payoffs-whether the intrusions
were necessary to address public safety concerns. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 154; Meares,
supra note 44.
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suspicion-at times, hunches-that have raised a steady stream of
Fourth Amendment problems. 206 While this was not unknown or
unanticipated at the outset of the Terry era, the inherent subjectivity of
reasonable suspicion became problematic decades later as the "new
policing" unfolded and investigative stops became less a practice of
individual discretion as a systematic policy-driven program. 207
Investigative stops were an essential element of modern proactive
policing, and those often were pursued aggressively both in quantity
and interaction quality. Yet, these analyses show in New York City
that stops based on general categories of suspicion that are not tied to a
particular behavior have no crime reduction benefit, even though they
were encouraged in an effort to reduce crime.
At the outset of the Terry era, in the midst of spiking crime rates
and civil unrest, 2 0 8 the Terry Court's comments on reasonable suspicion

were framed as making sure that an officer's actions were reviewable
both within police agencies and in the courts. 209 Neither the Terry
Court, nor later courts reviewing Terry's standard, ever articulated
sufficient detail to allow the police to know whether their actions were
constitutional. Substance was almost never part of that discussion.
While the reviewability prong of Terry's doctrine no doubt anticipated a
period of sorting out by appellate courts, 210 what was a small caseload
burden on the courts grew over the years into a long string of
contentious decisions, nearly all of which expanded the scope of
reasonable suspicion. 211 So, one of Terry's sins was placing a substantial
burden of review on federal trial and appellate courts in a succession of
suppression motions and constitutional challenges. 212 That may well

&

200
See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 427
(2004) (claiming that Terry failed to achieve its stated purpose of tying the practice [or
investigative stops] to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard); see also Harcourt
Meares, supra note 63 (claiming that intractable problems in regulating police discretion in Terry
stops suggest that discretionary stops based on reasonable suspicion should be replaced by
randomized stops that are tailored in probability to local crime rates).
207
See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 154; Meares, supra note 44.
208
See REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1967); see also WILLIAM
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).

209 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) ("Thus, in our system, evidentiary
rulings provide
the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as
comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents.").
210
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. BrigoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); People v. Holman, 590 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1992); People v. De Bour, 352
N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
211
Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1899-1900 (2015).
212
A quick glance at the docket of the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division
in
the U.S. Department of Justice shows a roster of active consent decrees in twelve cities, nearly
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have been the opposite of what the Terry court perhaps sought: to
create a procedural rule that would relieve courts of that burden.
Asking courts to perform a regulatory function in sorting out
constitutional violations in everyday policing is one thing, but asking
those same courts to do so in the absence of an articulable standard of
conduct is asking too much.
The story becomes more complicated by the fact that some stops,
however subjective they may be, will be constitutional under the
current case law. Even when a lawful stop proceeds with verbal or
physical aggression by the officer, the stop can be lawful under Terry's
expansive view of reasonable suspicion. 2 13 Stops are constitutional so
long as officers can articulate facts that are reasonable to other officers
given their knowledge and circumstances. But the story is complicated
simply by the numbers: when suspicion becomes so inflated as to
challenge the boundaries of legality, then it is the practice itself that
becomes a contested constitutional matter. The boundary between
lawful and unlawful policing is not easy to draw, 2 14 but courts as well
as government have done so now on several occasions. 215 Still, when
courts act as regulators of reasonable suspicion, police officers who are
able and willing to spin their behavior in a way that will satisfy judges
who reflexively defer to police "expertise," while officers who are less
verbally facile or who are transparent about their subjective
assessment and motivations are more likely to be penalized. 216
The lesson here is that some bases of suspicion are both
constitutional and productive, while others may be constitutional but
unproductive, and still others are neither constitutional nor productive.
But since all stops have costs that are borne by innocents as well as the

half of which can be traced either to a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations in stops, or
unwarranted racial disparities in the practice of Terry stops. See Civil Rights Div., Special
Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/special-

litigation-section-cases-and-matters0#police [https://perma.cefZ7TA-ABQG]; see also Rachel A.
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 n.50
(2009).
213 See Rebecca Kaplan, NYPD Chief: PolicingInvolving Use of Force, It Always Looks Awful,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2014), http: //www.cbsnews.com/news/after-eric-garner-death-nypd-plansinvestigation-and-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/48BD-NT57].
214
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 523 U.S. 41, 64 (1998) (showing the difficulty of
designing a constitutionally valid basis for exerting police authority in the context of activities
that might or might not be markers of criminal activity).
m See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 137; Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing:
Normative and Empirical Challenges (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-003,
2015).
216 See Lerner, supra note 200; see also Anna Lvovsky, The JudicialPresumption of Police
Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (analyzing and critiquing the widespread judicial
deference to police testimony and expertise in resolving Fourth Amendment claims).
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guilty, communities and those stopped should not have to pay for those
costs that are not worth it. Those stopped shouldn't have to bear the
burdens of police hunches or stops otherwise based on thin suspicion if
they in fact are not guilty. This was one part of the "impossibility" that
Professor Stuntz wrote about in 1998,217 shortly after the downside of
the new policing became a focus of legal, political, and social conflict.
B.

Moving to Regulation

A reset to more concrete indicia. of suspicion suggested by the
empirical results here hold promise to reverse those sins. Put simply,
the Terry standard should be pushed toward a narrower and objective
standard in light of this research. The reset involves two domains. One
is a constitutional story that also raises regulatory issues. The
constitutional story asks whether the procedure and subjective
standards in Terry and later cases lead to violations of individual
rights, and whether citizens can be asked to sacrifice those rights to
social welfare criminal justice interests. The regulatory story is an
institutional story: how to design models of oversight and assessment
by accountable agents to ensure that the practices remain within the
diffuse boundaries of reasonable suspicion, and also emphasizing the
use of stops that maximize social welfare goals of crime deterrence. The
regulatory challenge is to tether that practice both to the constitutional
parameters and to practices that pay.
The prospects for regulation of Terry stops through a more
narrowly tailored schema of suspicion are good. At the least, shifting
stops toward probable cause or behavioral indicia will shrink the stop
circumstances that might otherwise be legally contested, reducing the
burdens on trial and appellate courts. A shift in emphasis also creates a
vocabulary and logic for internal audit, supervision, and regulation.
Officers can be required to answer for what they do, not what they
say. 2 1 8 In contrast, it is not hard to imagine the difficulty of internally
auditing the indicia of suspicion for the vague categories of "furtive
movements" that were sharply criticized in the Floyd opinion. 219
Instead, the process of auditing a claim of "violent crime" or "drug
transaction" or even the more subjective marker of "casing a store" can
involve a perceptually shared set of behavioral categories that might be

See Stuntz, supra note 42; see also Meares, supra note 44.
Fagan & Geller, supra note 72; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (criticizing plaintiffs' expert for being too conservative in estimating the extent of
constitutionally flawed bases of suspicion for stops).
219 See supra note 192 and accompanying
text.
217
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more amenable to training on substantive criteria in lieu of procedural
ones. Auditing of officers' expressions of suspicion can promote learning
and updating, which should be visible when officers' actions are viewed
across a range of citizen contacts. Auditing internally also creates a
context of observational data that can inform collaboration among
officers, and for democratic participation by politically accountable
agents with police and citizens. The positive returns of collaboration
have been observed in studies of police institutional reform in
Cincinnati and other smaller departments. 220
C.

Harm Reduction

Hewing closer to objective and behaviorally specific markers of
suspicion will narrow the circumstances where stops are conducted. A
likely result will be a reduction in the scope and magnitude of false
positives-low seizure and arrest rates, weak crime control returnsobserved in the Floyd and reported by monitors in Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia221 litigation. Even though the Terry Court was careful to
state that reasonable suspicion was necessary to authorize a frisk, not
necessarily the stop itself, its crime control agenda moved reasonable
suspicion from the background of the original opinion to the forefront of
contemporary case law. 2 2 2 And in linking Terry stops to a crime control
agenda, it was not hard to explain how reasonable suspicion became
the basis to justify an investigative stop. 2 2 3
Beyond the costs of a wrong guess by police that leads to a
temporary street detention, the Terry Court worried about a variety of
"petty indignities." 224 The indignities of this form of order maintenance
in effect piled up from the accumulation of stops, not simply from
"" See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Due Process of Administration: The Problem of
Police Accountability (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper 14-420, 2014); see also Eliot H.
Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of the Cincinnati Police
Department, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 557-59 (2012).
221
See P1's Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia, C.A. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
222
See Meares, supra note 44; see, e.g., Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (suggesting
that ambiguous behaviors in a high crime area could heighten suspicion and justify a stop). But see
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1141-44 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the overbreadth of "high crime area" as a component of reasonable
suspicion).
221 See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 63.
224
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) ("Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such
a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a
wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly."); see also Akil Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. R. 1100, 1101 (1998); Steiker, supra note 35.
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publicly visible frisks. 225 As Terry's crime control agenda took root, the
exposure of citizens, both innocents and those engaged in crime, to a
new form street stops grew exponentially. The indignity problem arises
not from the indignity of the frisk or the search, but from the context of
the stop itself. And the dignity problem also arises not from the sheer
prevalence of unproductive stops and the burden on innocents
(although that itself is a concern), but from the ways those stops often
are conducted. 226 Even the most neutral of stops carries emotional
freight and the threat of indignities. The concern here is what happens
before, during, and after these stops, or how encounters with the police
take place and then unfold, rather than on simply the regulatory
questions of whether, where, and how often they occur. 227
Professor Stuntz identified four types of harm from inchoate and
unproductive stops: (1) privacy incursions, or the coercive invasion of
one's property or body; (2) targeting harm, being singled out in public
by the police and treated like a criminal suspect; 228 (3) the harm of
using racial bias to justify these incursions on liberty, or using race as a
signal of suspicion if not criminality on black citizens simply by virtue
of being black or moving about in a black neighborhood; 2 2 9 and (4) the
risks of verbal and physical force that accompanies stops and
searches. 230

225
See Stuntz, supra note 42; see also, Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a Pointless Indignity, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 989
(2014)
226
See Apel, supra note 197 (noting the potential chilling effect on innocents who may be
reluctant to move freely in public spheres fearing unwarranted Terry stops by police).
227
See Stuntz, supra note 42 (citing two dimensions of Fourth Amendment regulation that
ignore interaction content and demeanor).
228 See
Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1501 (1996); see also CHARLES R. Epp ET AL., PULLED

OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 134-51 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather

eds., 2014). The first two types of harm are often joined. An innocent person could reasonably ask
why me? Why would a police officer use her discretion to single out me of all people absent some
concrete evidence or signs that I was up to no good? Why would s/he have a "hunch" that I am a
criminal? Targeting harm then, encompasses both an innocence harm plus the basic harm to
autonomy of targeting.
229
EPP ET AL., supra note 228. To a similar extent, the same harms accrue to Latino young
men, as well as Latino and black young adults. See VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE
LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS (2011). Bennet Capers refers to this as a form of "public
shaming" that is skewed toward black men. See Bennet Capers, Policing, Race and Place, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 43, 68 (2009) (stating a similar claims in terms of "public shaming").
230
See Rod K. Brunson & Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White Youths in
Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 URB. AFFAIRS REV. 858, 869-73 (2009); see also Stuntz, supra
note 42; RIOS, supra note 229; Michael Powell, Police Polish Image, but Concerns Persist, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at Bi (reporting on interviews with young Latino and black males on physical
violence and harassment by police in everyday stop-and-frisk encounters in New York City during
the latter half of 2008).
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These psychological and perhaps physical harms risk not only
indignities to the person, but also legitimacy costs to the larger
community. Intrusive stops that are not based on actual perceived
criminal behavior have reduce the perceived legitimacy of the police,
and risk the harm of withdrawal of citizens from the co-production
(with police) of security and public safety. 2 3 1 The harms accrue from
both direct and vicarious interactions-young persons observing the
police are as likely to report lower police legitimacy as are those who
have direct experience. 232 They are less likely to serve on juries or
cooperate with police in investigations of crime reports. 233
Assume that legitimacy is produced through the aggregation of
interactions within individuals and authorities, and is a language and
shared currency of social exchange signals that acknowledge the
individual's dignity, respect, worth and belonging is essential to
democratic participation. 234 If that were right, then simply reducing the
scope of stops and narrowing the bases of suspicion to objective indicia
of criminal activity would narrow the scope of indignities and harms.
Targeting harms would be reduced by reining in "hunches" or actuarial
suspicion based on police officers' use of collective suspicion or Bayesian
attributions of criminal intent. 235 And narrowing would also reduce the
emotional and psychological toll of these unwarranted intrusions. 236
"Why me?" would no longer be a salient question for the residents of
many urban neighborhoods who bear much of the burden for the
contemporary practice of Terry stops.
The racial component of targeting harms in particular could be
addressed through narrowing. Racial tensions are inextricably linked to

231
See, e.g., Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the
Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1063 (2012); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey
Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their
Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 236-37 (2008); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and
Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men's Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 751, 758 (2014).
232 Tyler et al., supra note 231.
233 Id.; see also Tyler & Fagan, supra
note 231.
234
See DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 15-16 (1991) (defining legitimacy
along three dimensions, including rules that are justified "by reference to beliefs shared by both
dominant and subordinate"); see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (discussing ways in which legitimacy facilitates
state exercise of power because individuals view authorities as morally or normatively
appropriate).
235 See Fagan & Geller, supra note 72.
6
See Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Men, 104
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323-24 (2014) (showing elevated rates of anxiety, post-traumatic
stress symptoms, and perceived stigma as a function of increasing number of stops and increasing
intrusiveness of those stops).
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the drift in reasonable suspicion toward both subjectivity and
programmatic overreach. 2 37 Resetting to narrowly defined legal
categories may not cure racial disparities, but would likely reduce the
disparate exposure to policing by race by narrowing the circumstances
for permissible stops. The heaping of indignities from law enforcement
and other legal actors on African Americans has special meaning for
that community. Glenn Loury explains how the pervasive societal
stigmatization of African Americans marginalizes their community
from the institutions and norms that "mainstream" society purports to
value. 238

For African Americans, the sense of gain or loss suffered through
the aggregation of social interactions with the state is an important
part of collective or shared experiences. 239 Conferring respect before the
law means conferring social and democratic belonging, a form of social
recognition that conveys the shared moral and legal norms between
citizens and those who enforce the law. This sense of belonging and
social recognition is described in rich detail by Charles Epp and his
colleagues in Pulled Over,240 and suggests another, and perhaps more
important, potential dignitary benefit of a narrower basis for stops. Epp
et al. make an important distinction between being treated respectfully
(whether or not lawfully) and being treated legally. 241 The respondents
in their survey were more concerned with being treated legally than
with politeness or other procedural qualities. 242 In this form of social
recognition in law, we imagine ourselves as how other people see us,
and we understand who we are in and through our relationships with
others. This form of recognition by legal actors-by applying law
equally-affects the ties of groups to legal authority, and to the moral
norms that legal actors both express and enforce. In other words, being

237
See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that
the indicia of suspicion were different for non-white compared to white suspects, and that
disparities in "hit rates" could reflect those differences-and weaknesses-in the suspicion that
was used to justify stops of black and Latino citizens).

"
239

See GLENN LOURY, ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002).
See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 77

(1994) (explaining the linked fate concept as a means of explaining the way that African
Americans perceive what is in their individual self-interest.); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L.
Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority
Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 179-80 (2008).
240

EPP ET AL., supra note 228.

See id. at 115-20.
Id.; see also Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police
Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 315, 345 (2004) (showing that
officers engaged in unconstitutional searches were also more likely than officers who engaged in
constitutional searches to be friendly and courteous to suspects).
241
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nice is one thing, perhaps a low cost and generous if not patronizing act
on the part of a legal actor holding considerable power, but expressively
acknowledging the rights of a person before the law is quite another.
Undoing dignitary harms leans strongly toward the latter view.
D.

Regulatory Algebra

Substantive laws that criminalize relatively harmless or benign
acts can animate the use of police power to carry out Terry stops to a
broad spectrum of behaviors and actions. But it was never clear that
the use of Terry's stop power was aimed at trivial crimes, or as a
pretext for conducting field investigations as a fishing exercise based on
hunches. 243 Those hunches often are instantiated in current practice, 244
which seem to be artifacts of the capacious and inchoate indicia of
reasonable suspicion. One remedy is to recalibrate suspicion in the
context of Terry stops to move away from subjective criteria and
reliance on officers' experience-based judgments to a regime of
objective, behaviorally-defined indicia of suspicion.
The move toward more objective and behavioral bases of suspicion
does not mean that the police should abandon the practice of Terry
stops. What it does imply is that there is a tradeoff to using this power
too broadly, and the regulatory response requires adjusting the
thresholds for police contact. As a matter of policy, the broad use of
Terry's stop power is encouraged by the new policing, especially in the
context of robust order maintenance regimes. 245 Therein lies the
trouble. Terry stops should require a higher level of suspicion than an
officer's hunch or subjective appraisal that "crime is afoot". The Terry
Court never said which crimes had to be "afoot" to justify a stop, only
that the act was criminal. When the criminal law is so broadly
enforced, and when non-criminal violations or local ordinances are
integrated with the overall mission of street policing to detect weapons
and control violence, the likelihood increases that both benign and
serious crimes will be part of the umbrella of suspicion. The burden of
proof for administrative violations or low-level misdemeanor offenses is

The Terry Court abhorred hunches, terming them "inarticulate." 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)
(holding that intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights must be based on more than
inarticulate hunches).
244
Fifth Pl's Progress Report, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 221; Opinion and
243

Order, supra note 176 (linking the low seizure rates to Fourth Amendment violations in carrying
out Terry stops).
245 Heymann, supra note 154; see, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of

Life in Public Spaces: Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. R. 551, 558 (1997);
Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 58-59 (2003).
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intrinsically lower than for felony offenses and places Terry's
fundamental rules at risk.
Imagine that we have two types of acts-a benign act and a
harmful one. Intervening in the relatively benign act, such as a
violation of an administrative code, seems to benefit almost no onethere are few public benefits to crime control in that instance, since the
range of harm is largely private or de minimus. Even if one accepts that
some aspects of disorder may be criminogenic, itself a heavily contested
notion, the argument here is that the treatment through criminal
enforcement may have iatrogenic effects on legitimacy and cooperation.
That is, we may stop someone from smoking in public, or drinking from
an open container, playing loud music in a residential area, or jumping
turnstiles on public transit. We may signal "order" by enforcing these
laws, but their relationship to public safety is path dependent on the
questionable relationship between theories of social or physical disorder
and crime. 24 6 Worse, such enforcement may engender withdrawal if not
resistance to cooperation with the police. 247 This may seem like an
efficient use of a scarce public good-policing-because "hit rates" may
be high, but the yield for public safety is low if these low-level crimes
are not gateways to violence or major property crimes.

Figure 4. Probability Distributions for Strength of Evidence

Harful Acts

Benign Acts

x
Source: Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 757 (2011).

246

See, e.g., BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies,

Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 457, 467 (2000); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 178; Sampson & Raudenbush,
Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods,
105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 611 (1999).
247
Tyler & Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, supra note 231.
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More important, the burden of proof in these instances is
intrinsically low. 2 4 8 Policing benign acts may satisfy the demand for
metrics of police productivity, but its contribution to crime control is
dubious. 249 Aggressive enforcement of benign acts also has efficiency
costs by distracting police from intervening in the more harmful ones.
It is only in the shared space of benign and harmful acts, where it
makes sense to intervene in the benign act at a lower standard of proof,
and the size of that shared space is part of a contentious debate. 250 The
social harms from undetected harmful acts will outweigh any private or
small-scale benefits from intervening in the benign acts. Figure 4
illustrates how the social good in the form of public safety seems to be
greater when we focus our attention on the more serious acts. In other
words, do not sweat the little stuff, and focus on more serious acts with
more consequential public harms. This is simple regulatory algebra.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both law enforcement and citizen interests are better served by a
recalibration of Terry standards to move them closer to Mapp's more
exacting probable cause standard. A more workable and easily
understood standard for regulating police use of the stop power would
create a more comfortable space internally for police to monitor, audit,
and regulate compliance with constitutional law as well as internal
policy. And it also can provide a standard that moves away from the
subjective criteria that Terry invited and toward criteria that are less
vulnerable to cognitive error, perceptual distortions, and social harms.
Secondary benefits for legitimacy may well follow. Penance for Terry's
original sin is within reach.

241 See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 748 (2011) (arguing that strong
evidence is necessary to assign liability or culpability since the proof burden can affect the design
accuracy of enforcement).
249 Anthony A. Braga, Brandon C. Welsh & Cory Schnell, Can Policing DisorderReduce Crime?
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 52 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 567, 578 (2015) (reporting
non-significant effects of aggressive order-maintenance policing strategies on crime reduction).
Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 178.
255
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APPENDIX A
Aggregate Category
Murder
Violent Crime

Minor Violent Crime

Drug Crime

Marijuana Possession
Marijuana Sale
Part I Property Crime

Minor Property Crime

Suspected Offenses
Murder
Aggravated Assault
Aggravated Harassment
Aggravated Sexual Abuse
Assault
Kidnapping
Rape
Robbery
Harassment
Hazing
Jostling
Menacing
Reckless Endangerment
Resisting Arrest
Riot
Unlawful Imprisonment
Vehicular Assault
Criminal Possession of Controlled Substances
Criminal Sale of Controlled Substances
Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
Other Drug Offenses
Criminal Possession of Marijuana
Criminal Sale of Marijuana
Arson
Burglary
Grand Larceny
Grand Larceny Auto
Auto Stripping
Computer Trespass
Criminal Possession of Stolen Property
Criminal Mischief
Criminal Possession of Computer Materials
Criminal Possession of Forged Instruments
Criminal Tampering
Misapplication of Property
Petit Larceny
Possession of Burglar Tools
Reckless Endangerment of Property
Theft of Services
Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
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Trespass
Prostitution and Related
Terrorism
Quality of Life/Disorder

Sex Crimes and Related

97

97
Falsifying Business Records
Forgery
Forgery of a VIN
Fraud
Fraudulent Accosting
Insurance Fraud
Tampering with a Public Record
Unlawful Use of Credit Card, Debit
Criminal Trespass
Prostitution
Terrorism
Eavesdropping
Fortune Telling
Gambling
Loitering
Making Graffiti
Obscenity
Obstructing Firefighting Operations
Obstructing Governmental Administration
Possession of Graffiti Instruments
Trademark Counterfeiting
Unlawfully Dealing with Fireworks
Unauthorized Recording
Unlawful Assembly
Disorderly Conduct
Quality of Life
Riding Bike on the Sidewalk
Alcohol Violation
Abortion
Adultery
Bigamy
Course of Sexual Conduct
Incest
Public Display of Offensive Sexual Material
Public Lewdness
Sexual Abuse
Sexual Misconduct
Sodomy
Forcible Touching
Other Minor Sex Crimes

